

Powering through: Political uncertainty in hybrid regimes

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- Overview of theory - what are hybrid public goods regimes?

Presentation Outline

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
Theoretical Expectations 2/2

Electricity	Water	
	Embedded	Private
Private, high quality	Low uncertainty H2a	Low uncertainty
Private, low quality	Medium uncertainty	High uncertainty H2b


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Hybrid Regimes in Karachi - 1998



Hybrid Regimes in Karachi - 2018







Figure: District South with PMTs

- LG Elections 2015 → PMT August 2017 & Jan 2018 → Survey July/August 2018
- Loss Category - PMT level
- Loss Difference - Difference at matched PMTs between 2017 and 2018

Competition and Service Delivery outcomes



District FEs. Robust SEs. CIs at 95%

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Figure: Ganchipara, Lyari - KE Camp



Figure: Singho Lane, Lyari - KE Camp




Figure: Survey Data: Interacting water with electricity

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Discussion and further work

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The End




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Private, low quality	Medium uncertainty Singho Lane (S) Chakiwara (S)	High uncertainty Hanifabad (W) Ganchipara (S)