



Policy Brief

POLICING IN HYBRID
REGIMES: PROVINCIAL
AUTONOMY, POLICING,
AND THE 18TH
AMENDMENT IN PAKISTAN

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Introduction: Policing in a Hybrid Governance Milieu in Pakistan

Pakistan's military has long been an influential decision-maker in the country's governance structure. One of the primary areas in which this role has been observed is domestic policing and law enforcement as well as related domains of national security, internal security, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism.

While the military has traditionally dominated in areas of foreign policy, defense, internal securityⁱ, intelligence-gathering, and increasingly in routine policing and maintenance of public order, it has also been on the receiving end of much international assistance and aid provided for counterinsurgency.ⁱⁱ This has been the case even after the civilian police have been recognized, by domestic and international policymakers alike, as a more effective institution in countering insurgent violence.ⁱⁱⁱ

Since 2014, civil-military hybridization has also been enabled by the increasing involvement of military and paramilitary forces in internal security operations, and the legislative instruments enabling this involvement (such as the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1997 that empowers paramilitary forces to be called in for such operations in aid of civil power), supported by mechanisms such as military courts (that were operational between 2014 and 2019). In cementing their presence in this internal security landscape, military and hybrid regimes have not only undermined civilian authority over law enforcement, but also provincial autonomy.

This is not to suggest, however, that civilian governments have not ceded space to military authorities on these matters, especially to strengthen their own positions against political opponents. This deference has also been possible because despite devolution of political power, matters pertaining to internal security operations have been largely addressed by politicians and police officers "in conjunction with their military counterparts", without any clear guidance on funding or without the nexus between civil and military engagements for these operations and arrangements being clearly spelled out.^{iv}

But such deference must be contextualized against the politician's and civil bureaucrat's vulnerabilities resulting from hybrid power arrangements and the military's sustained tendency to encroach on civilian domains, limiting civilian governments' management of key military and intelligence offices, and retaining control over security and intelligence spheres. This outcome has been termed as the "militarization of civilian bureaucracy"^v.

Civilian governments have tried to curb this encroachment through legal and constitutional amendments, most notably the 18th amendment. Although the 18th amendment sought to secure provincial autonomy in several policy areas, its protection of provincial autonomy in matters of police governance, internal security, and the maintenance of public order remains ambiguous and vulnerable to political and judicial contestation.

This brief, based on research primarily conducted in 2022 and early 2023, explores two key questions: First, how is provincial autonomy (and, by extension, decentralization of power) undermined in the field of public policing in hybrid regimes, particularly due to encroachments by military institutions into policing roles? And second, can constitutional provisions, mainly the 18th amendment, uphold provincial autonomy (and the decentralization of power) and curtail hybridity in such a pluralized policing landscape?

We suggest that, in the case of Pakistan, the impact of the 18th amendment in the policy area of policing and law and order has been limited due to the complicated constitutional status of the police; variations in hybridity between provinces and even within provinces; and the military's continued encroachment into these areas in informal and indirect ways. We present our findings primarily through the cases of Sindh and Punjab, but also provide some discussion of policing dynamics in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan.

1. Policing in Hybrid Regimes

Scholars of transitions from military to civilian rule have found that democratization may have limited impact on police governance if a country experiences periods of hybridity under “civilian” rule. While new patronage networks may be generated (as between the police, politicians, and the military, bureaucratic, or judicial elites), reforms that can usher police accountability may be stalled, and militarized policing responses may instead be preferred^{vi}.

Furthermore, in periods of hybridity, coercive institutions such as the police or military can become agents of maintaining the dominance of the central government, through coercion and control. This is particularly concerning when more than one policing agency is responsible for maintaining order, and where we are likely to find pluralized and “hybrid security arrangements”^{vii}. When the military has direct control over the police, and governance is centralized, law enforcement remains repressive and democratic transitions do not improve the culture of impunity.^{viii} Where there is a less direct and “informal fusion” between military and police, policing is still seen to be militarized and repressive.^{ix} In the case of Pakistan, under both military and civilian (hybrid) regimes, law enforcement has remained a militarized endeavor.

Even where this democratization has been accompanied by decentralization, the process of decentralization has created new bureaucratic challenges, including new patron-client relationships that keep police under political controls and ensure the police continue to rely on authoritarian practices^x.

Hybrid governance in Pakistan has furthered militarization in two ways. First, it has sustained the pluralization of policing, in which the military has participated directly and indirectly in local policing. While such pluralization can pave way for need-based alliances between agencies, it can also create competition over resources and legitimacy.^{xi} Second, a pluralized landscape allows the military to develop “security networks” with civilian and private security/policing providers, further blurring the divide between “civilian” and “military” policing.^{xii} These networks allow the military to influence and intervene into policework by (a) supporting federal officers to curb provincial governments' command over the police, and (b) influencing appointment, recruitment, and transfer processes.

1.1.The Structure of Police Governance in Pakistan

The bureaucratic structure of the police in Pakistan consists of the Police Services of Pakistan (PSP), a branch of Pakistan's premier civil service structure. The PSP cadre are appointed by a federal body and posted provincially. The PSP comprises elite officers who represent the "professional police bureaucracy". These officers are federally appointed through the Establishment Division, one of the most important divisions of the federal government. These federal bureaucrats command and administer provincial cadres of police officers. The PSP officers are frequently posted outside of their "home provinces" in managerial capacity and are not necessarily representative of local populations. This has been particularly true in the cases of Sindh and Balochistan, provinces that have periodically seen federally-appointed PSP officers posted from Punjab and KP. Beyond the PSP cadre, provincial governments are responsible for appointing and posting junior officers, recruited provincially, who make up the bulk of police departments.

Pakistan's police services were governed under the 1861 Police Act, which empowered politicians and bureaucrats to exercise superintendence over the police, making police accountable to the ruling elite. In 2002, the 1861 Act was replaced by the Police Order 2002 (PO2002). The PO2002 sought to restrict provincial governments' controls over the police and instill a "democratic" policing structure by introducing external accountability and oversight mechanisms (although these were selectively implemented). Further, it intended to "reduce the role of the political executive in transfer and postings of police officers including head of police forces".^{xiii} In spirit, it intended to make the police "function according to the Constitution, law, and democratic aspirations of the people of Pakistan".^{xiv} In 2004, the PO2002 was robbed of this spirit when the Musharraf government brought back oversight of the political executive through subsequent amendments to the PO2002, caving into the demands of political allies who promised greater electoral gains for the President-General in exchange for administrative command over the police. Each provincial governments were thereby able to make subsequent amendments to the PO2002, curtailing police officers' autonomy and ensuring that police administration was subject to the oversight of provincial bureaucrats.^{xv}

2. The 18th Amendment and Impact on Policing

In 1973, the Constitution included two lists: The federal government had the exclusive right to legislate on subjects falling under the "Federal Legislative List", and "Concurrent List" of subjects included those over which both federal and provincial legislatures had the right to legislate. Under Article 183, however, it was stated that in case of inconsistencies between an act of Parliament and act of a Provincial Assembly, the act of Parliament would prevail. As per this constitution, "criminal law", "criminal procedure", and "evidence" fell under the concurrent list. In the absence of a clear provision on policing, police governance and the maintenance of law and order continued to be interpreted as a provincial subject.

In 2010, the 18th amendment abolished the Concurrent List, bringing it down from 47 subjects to three subjects. The Federal List now had two parts: Part I contained 59 items and Part II contained eight. Subjects in Part I are the exclusive responsibility of the Federal Government, whereas subjects in Part II are to be deliberated and decided upon jointly by the federation and provinces through the Council of Common Interests. Four items were shifted from Part I to Part II of the Federal Legislative List including "extension of the powers and jurisdiction of members of a provincial police force to other provinces." Policing, however, had neither been on the federal nor concurrent lists before the 18th amendment, which ostensibly meant that, as

a residual subject, policing remained a provincial subject. However, three subjects remained on the otherwise-abolished concurrent list: criminal law, criminal procedure, and evidence, all closely related to matters of policing. Thus, the absence of any mention of policing as a subject in the constitution, but the retention of criminal law and procedure as subjects on which both federal and provincial legislatures could legislate (Article 142(b)), has created ambiguity regarding the constitutional status of policing.

Following the 18th amendment, each province opted to enact its own version of legislation on police governance and administration. Punjab and KP retained amended versions of the PO2002. Sindh and Balochistan reverted to the 1861 Act, arguing that policing was the legislative domain of provincial assemblies and therefore PO2002 could be repealed. Even in provinces where PO2002 was implemented, it was done so selectively, and such implementation has yet to evidence signs of “democratic” policing. As one lawyer told us:

“The federal government did not want PO2002 to be implemented in full because then, realistically, the police would be beyond the control of the federal government too; it would be out of their hands. No one wants the police to be autonomous or more accountable to the people.”^{xvi}

Furthermore, such legislative changes did not debate on the pluralized policing landscape in Pakistan in which hybrid security arrangements significantly shape law enforcement.

3. A Pluralized Landscape

Policing in Pakistan is delivered through several key actors. Beyond the main police force, there are several specialized police units, such as Counter-Terrorism Departments (CTDs). CTDs and Anti-Terrorism Forces (in KP and Punjab) were established in 2015, to further the implementation of Pakistan’s primary counterterrorism policy, the National Action Plan. Such specialized units have been empowered over the years and work closely with civilian and military intelligence services, becoming one of the channels for relational interlinkages between civilian and military/intelligence institutions.

Additionally, policing is also conducted by paramilitary forces. These include, the Pakistan Rangers (in Sindh and Punjab), the Frontier Corps (Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan), and the Levies (Balochistan and KP). Our interlocutors have noted, that where paramilitary forces are deployed under the command of the armed forces, their “de facto power is said to be greater than their de jure power”, indicating a sustained encroachment of the military into domestic policing through paramilitary units.^{xvii}

Other platforms through which we see such civil-military command overlap is through the creation of Joint Investigation Teams (JITs) that investigate individual cases of serious crimes, as well as the so-called “apex committees”. Apex committees were created at provincial levels to oversee the implementation of counterterrorism and national security policies. Although they are provincially organized, these are hybrid bodies that include senior provincial bureaucrats and police officials, as well as leadership of paramilitary forces and army corps, and the Inter-Services Intelligence agency. Performances of anti-terrorism forces, and security and intelligence-based operations have often been overseen by apex committees.

3.1. Plural Policing and Provincial Autonomy

Due to the sustained hybridity of governance, the federal bureaucracy has been under the influence of the military. This is rendered possible due to the inability of civilian governments to “exercise control over security policy due to a weak political system; dysfunctional political parties; lack of political institutions, such as parliamentary committees or think tanks; and the militarization of the civilian bureaucracy”^{xviii}. Against this backdrop, the police have also been impacted by hybrid governance and the military’s encroachment. This has dire repercussions for provincial autonomy.

In this section, we map how the military’s involvement in internal policing and security provision impacts provincial autonomy and compromises the implementation of the 18th amendment variably. We focus predominantly on Punjab and Sindh, where resistance to and accommodation of the hybrid regime could be most starkly evidenced during our research.

3.1.1. Sindh

Sindh has witnessed the most glaring manifestation of pluralized policing affected by hybrid governance and military encroachment, primarily through the role of the Sindh Rangers who have been deployed to urban Sindh since the late 1980s. The Rangers are an army-led paramilitary force, under the control of the federal Interior Ministry, but senior command of which is deputed from the Pakistan Army. In the provincial capital of Karachi, the Rangers have been endowed with numerous policing powers and have played a key role in counterterrorism operations and maintenance of public order. Although authority vests in the provincial government of Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) to officially request the Rangers to maintain law and order, the PPP has done this partly to target its political opponents (chiefly, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement), and partly in acquiescence to the military and business elites who have vested interests in maintaining the presence of the Rangers in Karachi. Repeated extensions to Rangers policing powers have been provided by all provincial governments since the late 1980s.

Although officially, the paramilitary is there to control crime, militancy and terrorism, and political violence, it has steadily expanded its duties. During the Karachi Operation (2013-2018), the Rangers detained political party leaders on grounds of financial corruption. Furthermore, the paramilitary has moved beyond aiding the police, and has been actively pushed for participation with the community, taking a community-policing role to build greater legitimacy from within Karachi’s elite, primarily its business community^{xix}.

More indirectly, military’s encroachment into provincial autonomy over domestic law and order has also been enabled through hybrid structural arrangements, such as the apex committees. In 2016, the Sindh apex committee decided that Sindh Police would recruit 20,000 new personnel and they will be trained by the army—a move that was endorsed by the then Corps Commander, a senior army officer.^{xx} In 2017, as per the army’s own press release, the army high command had also advised the apex committee on matters pertaining to reforms in the Sindh Police and the internal workings of this provincial organization. The brief stated that that the army had made suggestions on the “internal functioning to include induction on merit, availability of young, trained leadership and the strengthening of command”^{xxi}. Because of such involvement, apex committees have appeared as “threats” to provincial autonomy in Sindh. As one PPP politician explained:

“Aren’t apex committees an example of federal interference in provincial offices? These committees were initially positive; there was good coordination between police, the Rangers, and the federal government. Then, members the PPP began to be picked up on terrorism charges, which created friction between the Sindh and federal government. In 2018, Imran Khan sought help from the army and ISI, and the military establishment told us to ‘go easy’ on him. It was during this hybrid regime that bureaucrats and officers stopped working because the regime started using the National Accountability Bureau against them [on corruption allegations]. As a bureaucrat and police officer, you now had to consider the encroachment of the NAB facilitated by the hybrid regime, the intelligence reports the regime had on you, and the province-center tussles taking place, in the middle of which officers would not know whether to please the federal government through which they were appointed, or the provincial government to whom they reported”.^{xxii}

Confronted with such direct and indirect encroachments of the military into policing in urban Sindh, the provincial government has actively confronted oppositional forces for control over Sindh Police. This has been demonstrated most starkly in the case of former IG, AD Khawaja.

In 2016, the federal government of PMLN and the Sindh government of PPP, and a “federalist” judiciary were at loggerheads over the tenure and posting of IG Khawaja. PPP’s attempts to control police management came in the context of military-led operations in Sindh, during which the armed forces were an important decision-maker and stakeholder. The PPP government was thus under pressure by military and intelligence agencies to instil institutional changes in the police, while the paramilitary force cracked down on PPP’s workers and other political parties.

In an already turbulent political environment and tense civil-military relations, the IG pushed for greater autonomy from the provincial government. In so doing, the IG, and other PSP officers in Sindh, strengthened linkages with key federal institutions, including the federal government and the military, making the PPP increasingly insecure about its command. The PPP thus strived to “squeeze” IG Khawaja out, who was supported by his allies in federal institutions and in civil society organizations in Karachi who sought to resist the PPP and petitioned the superior judiciary, challenging Khawaja’s transfer.

In court, the Sindh government asserted that under the 18th amendment, the prerogative to appoint a police chief was theirs. It relied on the long-standing presumption that policing was a provincial subject. It further relied on the Sindh Police Act (2011), which had replaced the PO2002 after the 18th amendment, and under which the provincial government had more control over police administration.

In its judgement, the Sindh High Court held that the “police” did not come within the scope of “criminal law” and procedure, and that after the 18th amendment, it was the provincial assemblies’ prerogative to alter, amend, or repeal the PO2002. Hence, the high court supported PPP’s provincial autonomy over police governance, but sought to provide structure to the government’s discretion in managing the provincial police force, particularly on the question of the appointment and removal of Inspector-Generals.

When the civil society organizations supporting Khawaja appealed the high court's decision in the Supreme Court, however, the apex court held that "policing" fell broadly within the field of "criminal law" and was therefore a concurrent subject, a matter on which the Sindh government could not legislate independently.

It's important to note here, however, that the Court was perhaps influenced in its decision by the argument that giving complete provincial control over the Sindh Police to the provincial government could result in greater autonomy for provinces over broader policing and security arrangements in which federal institutions (e.g. the military and judiciary) are key stakeholders. As one lawyer involved in these proceedings explained:

"The Chief Justice was told that if the Court made policing a completely provincial subject, then they would have to get rid of NAB, FIA, and the anti-terrorism apparatus in Pakistan, which are all federal policing mechanisms. This freaked the bench out."^{xxiii}

What the Court then produced was an incomplete judgement. They directed that the federal government and provincial government must "collaborate" on police governance and administration. In closing its statements, the Court held that "further reasons" for this judgement would follow, but a detailed order was never produced. In theory, the judiciary paved the way for a more autonomous police chief in Sindh, but less provincial autonomy for Sindh government, and lingering confusion over the constitutional status of the "police" given the incomplete judgement passed.

3.1.2 Punjab

Under Imran Khan's Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) (2018-2022), hybridity in the political system was significantly enhanced with the military playing an increasing role in governance across different policy areas. During this period, the Punjab Police saw intense political tussles over the administration of police command, as the military-backed federal government sought to produce a loyal Punjab administration after ending years of dominance by the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) in that province. This was evident most starkly in the removal of a former Inspector General of Police, Muhammad Tahir. Tahir's removal and replacement came despite resistance put forth by Imran Khan's trusted officer, former IG Nasir Durrani. Durrani had been credited for institutionalizing reforms in KP police, and was subsequently appointed to head a reform committee in Punjab by Khan. However, Khan's insistence on removing Tahir and appointing loyalist police chiefs instead led to a fall-out between Durrani and Khan, with the former resigning as chief of Punjab police reform committee. Under the PTI regime, at least seven provincial IGs were changed.

In contrast to what we find in Sindh, Punjab did not see civil society or judicial resistance to such political interferences in the police. Our interlocutors attributed this discrepancy to a potential "alignment" between Punjab's civil society and the government of PTI; in Sindh's case, this alignment was perhaps lacking with the government of the PPP.^{xxiv} That said, after the ouster of the PTI regime, we saw similar political interferences in the police during the brief stint of the PML-N in Punjab in 2022. According to a senior academic, the police and bureaucracy collectively "had become supplicants of political power"^{xxv}. This indicates that in the case of Punjab, aligned federal and provincial governments jointly seeking to control the provincial police has led to the politicization of senior appointments within the Punjab

Police, in spite of judicial decisions in other provinces that have put checks on such political interferences.

Since 2018, Punjab has also seen the military's influence over the police increase. As one police officer told us, *“Army's influence over the police is increasing. Rangers are now permanently in Punjab. They get extra allowances from the Punjab government. But they intervene as and when they like. Policing is becoming increasingly militarized.”*^{xxvi}

Although the Rangers are deployed ‘in aid of civil power’, and are utilized during protests, polls, patrols, and for joint intelligence-based operations (IBOs) or counterterrorism operations, they have also been relied upon to exert the army's control where needed. For example, the army has relied upon the Punjab Rangers to suppress the farmer's movement in Okara.

In addition to reliance upon paramilitary forces, Punjab's policing also relies on regional-level and district-level joint intelligence committees (JICs). As per respondents, provincial JICs work under provincial bureaucrats and also include the provincial police chief, but members of CTD, Military Intelligence, Inter-Services Intelligence, and Special Branch are also represented. These provincial and district JICs oversee policing and law-and-order-related issues, enabling bureaucrats to oversee policing in Punjab, but also enabling the influence of the military.

The nexus between bureaucrats and military in Punjab can also be witnessed through the informal ways in which police postings are influenced.

“Informally, the military can influence where police officers are posted and transferred. For example, if an ISI sector commander, or a brigadier, is sitting with the chief minister of Punjab, he can tell the minister to put XYZ police officer. Why would the minister resist? He would also have an interest in maintaining links with the ISI”.^{xxvii}

Furthermore, in addition to apex committees and JICs, our respondents also noted the role played by the ISI's vetting process. According to our respondents, such vetting of the federal bureaucrats, including police officers, used to be conducted by the Intelligence Bureau (a civil intelligence agency). But informally, the ISI has also been part of this vetting. In early 2022, following a notification issued by now prime minister Shahbaz Sharif, the ISI is now formally allowed to vet senior police officers and bureaucrats.^{xxviii} As one respondent told us, “every bureaucrat's dossier goes through intelligence agencies.”^{xxix}

As such, we find multiple channels through which the military is able to influence internal police functions in Punjab.

4. Constitutional Ambiguities and Hybrid Governance: Impact on Policing

In this section, we outline what we believe the impact of the 18th Amendment has been on hybridity in policing.

We suggest, first, that the 18th constitutional amendment left ambiguous the constitutional status of the police. Although traditionally understood to be a provincial subject, the retention of criminal law and criminal procedure in the concurrent list after the 18th amendment meant

that the status of police governance and administration was left to the judicial interpretations of superior courts. As one academic puts it, “*The concurrent list was about criminal law; they kept that in. But they were vague on policing. This was a masterstroke*”^{xxx}.

Second, we demonstrate that the military has multiple ways of intervening and encroaching into matters of civilian law enforcement and domestic policing, regardless of constitutional provisions. This is enabled, partly, due to the deference of the civilian governments themselves (especially on matters on security and counterinsurgency), and because of Pakistan’s pluralized security landscape on which the military has a complex, layered and relational reach. This reach is manifested in at least three ways:

1. Through indirect and informal alliances made with federal bureaucrats and federal institutions (including federally-appointed and provincially-posted police officers, as well as the judiciary—a “federalist” institution). This is evidenced, for example, in the way the army is able to influence its authority over the police. As one police officer from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa told us:

“The de facto authority in KP is with the army, even though the army should be here in aid of civil power. Under colonial rule, the bureaucrats had to call the army in. Now, all the powers are with the army. If they don’t like the IG, they change him. The [deputy commissioner] is just a figurehead now; administrative authority is with the army.”^{xxxi}

2. Through direct interventions on the part of the military, such as the deployment of paramilitary forces for indefinite periods of times during periods of emergencies (e.g., the Sindh and Punjab Rangers), and a history of long-running military operations to address prolonged periods of insurgencies (as in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), upon which the army has retained operational supremacy and hierarchical command. In Balochistan, for example, the majority of policing power rests with the armed forces. As one police officer explained:

“The army in Balochistan has a lot of say; they don’t operate with any terms of reference. They step in without a mandate and run the show. The chief minister and chief secretary assist the Corps Commander. The police have limited responsibilities, maybe in 20% of the province. The Frontier Corps has a massive footprint. Their mandate is open ended, but they have good coordination with the police and Levies.”^{xxxii}

3. Through formal and informal relational channels and structural arrangements within which the military is likely to find opportunities to make alliances with civilian officers, and vice versa. This is witnessed, for example, through the creation of JICs, ‘apex committees’, and other hybrid arrangements and mechanisms in which both civilian and military elite mutually decide upon matters of local and domestic policing and the maintenance of peace and security within Pakistan. A journalist in Peshawar echoed our findings from Sindh in telling us that “*apex committees in KP play a critical role in transfers and postings of police officers*”^{xxxiii}.

Therefore, because of the muddle created around police governance, and the direct and indirect ways in which the military continues to exert control in the field of policing, security,

and local law enforcement, we find provincial autonomy to be severely undermined with policing becoming an increasingly militarized and pluralized provision. The governance of policing in hybrid regimes therefore provides unique perspectives for global conversations around police militarization and reform.

5. Implications and Ways Forward

Having explored the constitutional status of the police and the hybrid security arrangements in place, we now ask: What are the implications of the above for policing and security sector reform in hybrid regimes such as Pakistan?

First, there needs for legal clarity on the status of policing, police structures, and police governance. Legal clarity is needed for ensuring consistent and constitutionally mandated administration of law and maintenance of public order. This is crucial for placing checks on the hybrid regime's undermining of civilian institutions and provincial autonomy.

Second, we suggest that elite disjuncture on police governance can create avenues for the expansion of the hybrid regime. When federal and provincial government are at odds over policies concerning security, such disjuncture can create space for military encroachment in alignment with one of two rival governments, especially when military institutions have a prior footprint in conflict-ridden jurisdictions.

Third, both provincial and federal governments have sought to politicize policing mechanisms in Pakistan, compromising their public accountability and transparency. Relatedly, attempts to create public oversight through select civil society organizations have neither been impartial nor truly representative of Pakistani society. In the process, competition persists over elite control of police departments, with the private sector frequently turning to the military as an alternative (as seen in Sindh).

Finally, internationally driven and donor-funded reforms frequently discount or inadequately consider the hybrid security arrangements within which civilian police departments, and their officials operate. Future evaluations of such efforts should pay due consideration to such pluralized landscapes of security provision, and the difficulties of implementing institutional change in police departments in hybrid regimes.

List of Acronyms

CTD	Counter-Terrorism Department
FIA	Federal Investigation Agency
IBO	Intelligence-Based Operations
IG	Inspector General
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence
JIC	Joint Intelligence Committee
JIT	Joint Investigation Committee
KP	Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa
NAB	National Accountability Bureau
PMLN	Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz
PO2002	Police Order 2002
PPP	Pakistan Peoples Party
PSP	Police Services of Pakistan
PTI	Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf

End Notes

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- ^{xxiv} Interview, police officer 06, 16 August 2022, Lahore.
- ^{xxv} Interview, academic 03, 23 August 2022, Karachi.
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- ^{xxxii} Interview, police officer, 04, Karachi.
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