

TA 4319-PAK  
Determinants and Drivers of Poverty Reduction and  
ADB's Contribution in Rural Pakistan

# Governance Impediments to Pro-Poor Change in Pakistan

Ali Cheema

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## **Preface**

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Pakistan have been development partners for almost 39 years. Assistance has averaged close to \$1 billion a year since 2004 supporting good governance, sustained pro-poor growth, inclusive social development, and targeted investment projects to reduce poverty and generate employment.

ADB has an active research agenda on economic and social development issues. A technical assistance titled ‘Determinants and Drivers of Poverty Reduction and ADB’s Contribution in Rural Pakistan,’ was approved by ADB in March 2004. It supported a detailed study of both chronic and transitory rural poverty and sought to identify appropriate policy and implementation measures to promote sustained poverty reduction. It was financed on a grant basis from the Poverty Reduction Cooperation Fund (PRF). The PRSP Secretariat of the Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, was the Executing Agency of the technical assistance.

The thematic papers presented here are interim outputs of this project. They are based primarily on fieldwork carried out by the authors and their research teams in diverse regions of rural Pakistan between June 2005 and March 2006. The fieldwork included three types of data collection: (a) qualitative research at the village level, (b) extended household survey of selected villages, and (c) cross-village rapid surveys in selected districts.

The innovative “drivers of change” approach to poverty reduction focuses on long-term structural drivers and determinants as well as on impediments to pro-poor change. Poverty-reduction correlates with higher economic growth, more equal distribution of assets and opportunity, higher real wages, better social indicators, improved governance, better access to resources, level playing field in markets, socio-economic mobility, and pro-poor delivery of public goods and services.

The thematic papers are being made available to support and enrich the debate on poverty reduction and economic growth. Comments and feedback received are appreciated.

**Peter L. Fedon**  
Country Director  
ADB Pakistan Resident Mission

## Abbreviations

ADB—	Asian Development Bank
CCB—	community citizen board
DFID—	UK Department for International Development
LUMS—	Lahore University of Management Sciences
NWFP—	North West Frontier Province
PRM—	Pakistan Resident Mission
SC—	school council
UNDP—	United Nations Development Programme
VNC—	village and neighborhood council

naib nazim	deputy mayor: convenor of local government council; takes over from nazim when he or she is away
nazim	mayor: elected head of local government
pind	(in Punjab) hamlet: a consolidated geographic settlement that is normally but not necessarily smaller than a revenue village
taluka	(in Sindh) administrative unit of local government, equivalent to a subdistrict
tehsil	administrative unit of local government, between a district and union

## NOTES

The analysis in this paper is up-to-date until January 2006 when the study was completed.

## GLOSSARY

barani	rain-fed (normally with reference to agricultural land)
deh	(in Sindh) the lowest-defined geographic unit functioning as a revenue village
goth	(in Sindh) hamlet: a consolidated geographic settlement that is normally but not necessarily smaller than a revenue village
kissan	farmer
mauza	(in Punjab and NWFP) the lowest defined geographic unit functioning as a revenue village

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# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Social Gaps and Poverty

There is growing appreciation in the academic and policy literature that poverty is a multifaceted phenomenon encompassing more than income and consumption deprivation (Dreze and Sen 1996, and Gazdar 2005).<sup>1</sup> Numerous studies in both the international and Pakistani context show that poverty is highly correlated with the acquisition of social, cultural, and political assets and forms of capital that are essential determinants of a citizen's position on the poverty scale.<sup>2</sup> The

important finding is that nonincome correlates of poverty are as, if not more, important as income correlates of poverty.

The worrying but unsurprising finding from the Pakistani literature is that there is a strong association between poverty and social gaps in Pakistan. The term "social gap" describes the gap between Pakistan's social development indicators relative to comparator countries with similar levels of income and similar rates of growth. As indicated in Table 1, this is true for important social development indicators such as illiteracy, primary school enrolment, basic health

**Table 1: Social Gaps and Poverty**

Indicators	Poor (%)	Nonpoor (%)
Overall Net Primary Enrolment		
<b>Total</b>	<b>36.6</b>	<b>59.3</b>
Male	43.0	66.0
Female	30.2	52.3
Rural Net Primary Enrolment		
<b>Total</b>	<b>33.4</b>	<b>53.6</b>
Male	41.7	61.7
Female	25.0	44.8
Access to Drinking Water		
Piped	18.7	28.2
Open Source	24.0	18.6
Access to Drainage System		
Underground	7.8	17.2
Open Drain	29.8	34.3
No Drain	52.4	48.5
Access to Toilet		
In Home	40.9	61.0
Outside Home	59.1	39.0
Access to Utilities (% of Population living in Households Connected to)		
Electricity	52.2	76.0
Gas	10.9	22.9
Telephone	7.4	22.2

Source: World Bank. 2004. *World Development Report 2004, Making Services Work for Poor People*. Washington, DC: World Bank. pp. 36-7.

- 1 See: Dreze, J., and A. Sen. 1996. *Indian Development: Selected Regional Perspectives* New Delhi: Oxford University Press; and Gazdar, H. 2005. Scoping Paper. Revised draft submitted for Determinants and Drivers of Poverty Reduction and ADB's Contribution in Rural Pakistan. Asian Development Bank (ADB), Islamabad.
- 2 See: Charlton, J., M. Cyan, Z. Hasnain, N. Manning, D. Porter, and H. Sharif. 2003. *Devolution in Pakistan—Preparing for Service Delivery Improvements*. World Bank, ADB, and UK Department for International Development (DFID); Dreze and Sen (1996) (footnote 1); Easterly, W. 2003. *The Political Economy of Growth without Development: A Case Study of Pakistan*. In *In Search of Prosperity: Analytical Narratives on Economics Growth*. Edited by D. Rodrick. New Jersey: Princeton University Press; Gazdar, H. 2002. *A Qualitative Survey of Poverty in Rural Pakistan: Methodology, Data, and Main Findings*. Karachi: Collective for Social Science Research; and World Bank. 2002. *Pakistan Poverty Assessment. Poverty in Pakistan: Vulnerabilities, Social Gaps, and Rural Dynamics*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

indicators, and access to social and physical infrastructure (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] 2004 and World Bank 2002 [footnote 2]).<sup>3</sup> What is even more worrying is that these poverty-creating “social gaps” persist in Pakistan in spite of the country’s relatively fast historical rate of growth, and continue to persist even after controlling for differences in the magnitude of public spending on social services (Easterly 2003, footnote 2).

The multifaceted nature of poverty is also highlighted by studies of poverty profiles,<sup>4</sup> which identify patterns of persistence of poverty in terms of urbanization and in terms of regional and household characteristics. The literature on Pakistan shows that rural poverty tends to be much higher than urban poverty. It also highlights considerable inter- and intra-provincial variation in the persistence of poverty. Furthermore, results based on household survey data show that access to agricultural land and, in particular, land ownership is a strong negative correlate of poverty as is levels of education, whereas levels of demographic dependency are positively related to poverty.

The poverty literature also suggests that levels of deprivation tend to be higher among socially excluded kinship groups, women, and the marginalized (Gazdar 2002 and World Bank 2002, footnote 2). That is, an individual’s gender and position in the social hierarchy are as important determinants of poverty as access to income and wealth. Furthermore, the literature shows that lack of access to social services mirrors the findings regarding poverty profiles. Lack of access to social services is much worse for rural areas and tends to be higher among socially excluded groups, women, and the marginalized. This suggests that there exists a vicious cycle between social gaps and poverty—with poverty resulting in high levels of social deprivation and the consequent low levels of human development reinforcing poverty. In turn, this vicious cycle appears to make poverty chronic for particular regions,

areas, gender groups, and socioeconomic groups.

A recognition that social gaps are extremely important correlates of poverty is a useful starting point for the design of a more comprehensive set of poverty reduction policies and strategies. However, a crucial issue from the policymaking perspective is to identify processes and drivers that help in the reduction of income and nonincome sources of poverty. In this perspective, identifying a correlate of poverty is a starting point for the analysis of socioeconomic and governance impediments that drive the particular statistical association in question. The task of policy is not only to identify which correlates of poverty to target but also to alter these impediments with targeted interventions to allow male and female citizens to break out of the vicious cycle of poverty.

## 1.2 Governance Failures and Social Gaps

The consensus in the literature is that shortfalls in public spending do not provide the entire explanation for Pakistan’s social development gaps. Instead, the literature argues that a more robust explanation has to be sought in failures of “governance” associated with public service providers, which include policymakers/politicians, bureaucrats, and frontline service providers (Charlton, et. al. 2003, footnote 2). The importance of “governance impediments” as a variable that explains Pakistan’s social gaps is best appreciated by the following findings from the literature:

- ♦ Pakistan’s social gaps persist relative to comparator economies even after controlling for shortfalls in magnitudes of social spending (Easterly 2003, footnote 2).
- ♦ Pakistan’s social development has been plagued by considerable inequality in social development outcomes across not only poor and nonpoor households but also: (i) rural-urban areas, (ii) gender, (iii) class, (iv) social groups and, (v) in certain areas, even between villages that lie in close proximity to one

<sup>3</sup> United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2004. *Human Development Report, Cultural Liberty in Today’s Diverse World*. USA: Oxford University Press.

<sup>4</sup> For a comprehensive review of the literature, see Gazdar (2005) (footnote 1).

another (Cheema and Mohmand 2004; Cheema and Mohmand 2005; Easterly 2003 [footnote 2]; and Keefer, Narayan, and Vishwanath 2005).<sup>5</sup>

These findings suggest that Pakistan's social gaps are rooted in political economy and governance failures. To the extent that the inequality of social provision outcomes reflects the failure of state targeting, it clearly reveals political and planning biases in state provision across different wealth, income, and social groups, and across different localities and jurisdictions. Similarly, the inequality of outcomes between poor and nonpoor cohorts points to processes of sociopolitical exclusion, which make the poor particularly under-provided and this, in turn, appears to further reinforce an existence at the margins of poverty. It appears that "governance-related impediments" have historically muted the ability of the poor, women, and marginalized citizens to hold governments and government functionaries accountable. This has, in turn, set incentives for governments and government functionaries to be unresponsive to the poor, women, and socially excluded and marginalized groups. This suggests that a viable poverty reduction strategy needs to analyze and overcome governance-related impediments to poverty.

### 1.3 Objectives and Questions of the Study

#### 1.3.1 Questions

The main aim of this study is to analyze governance impediments that reinforce poverty in Pakistan. The study is motivated by two simple but important questions:

- (i) What constrains the poor, women, and marginalized groups from holding the state and state functionaries accountable?
- (ii) What impediments to pro-poor accountability exist in the electoral and service delivery

spheres?

Answers to these questions are sought in the following corollary questions:

- (i) Do the poor, women, and marginalized groups have equal access to the electoral sphere or are there barriers to entry?
- (ii) Do the poor, women, and marginalized groups have access to and participate in electoral coalitions that represent their interests or are they dependent voters in electoral coalitions that are led by and represent elite and nonmarginalized groups?
- (iii) Do the poor, women, and marginalized groups have equal access to local-level politicians for the purposes of conveying development needs? If not, what factors explain this lack of access?
- (iv) Are there systematic biases in the targeting of local public goods provision in favor of socially and economically dominant groups?
- (v) Is there equal awareness of and participation in citizen-based participatory organizations that are linked to service delivery?

By addressing these questions this study aims to identify and analyze:

- (i) important determinants of anti-poor "accountability failures" in Pakistan; and
- (ii) processes that underlie the persistence of these determinants in Pakistan.

#### 1.3.2 Research Design

The study addresses these questions in the context of Pakistan's recent devolution reforms. The study, however, is not designed to assess the impact of devolution reforms on poverty-reduction outcomes. This is because, as pointed out by Charlton, et. al. (2003), the impact of devolution

<sup>5</sup> See: Cheema, A., and S. Mohmand. 2004. Provision Responses to Devolved Service Delivery—Case Evidence from Jaranwala Tehsil. Manuscript. Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS)-McGill Social Enterprise Development Programme. LUMS, Lahore; Cheema, A., and S. Mohmand. 2005. The Political Economy of Devolved Provision: Equity-based Targeting or Elite Capture—Case Evidence from 2 Pakistani Unions. Manuscript. LUMS, Lahore; and Keefer, P., A. Narayan, and T. Vishwanath. 2005. The Political Economy of Decentralization in Pakistan. In *Decentralization in Developing Countries: A Comparative Perspective*. Edited by P. Bardhan and D. Mookherjee. The MIT Press.

on poverty outcomes is difficult to assess at present because local government politicians and bureaucrats still do not have autonomous mandates and finances (footnote 2). Furthermore, considerable overlap of jurisdictions continue to exist between governments at different tiers, which makes it next to impossible to estimate and assess the impact devolution reforms are having on poverty-reduction outcomes.

Instead, the study uses an indirect design to analyze the effect that recent governance reforms in Pakistan are having on pro-poor accountability. The study is designed to analyze the interface between the poor, women, and marginalized citizens and local-level politicians, and between these citizen cohorts and citizen-based service delivery bodies that have been instituted as a result of the recent reforms. With regard to these interfaces the study asks whether the relative access of the poor, women, and marginalized groups to the local-level electoral sphere, to local government politicians, to planning and budgeting institutions, and to citizen-based service delivery bodies is in line with nonpoor, male, and non-marginalized groups in the new governance environment.

This is a key question to ask because an important logic underlying the devolution reforms is to create space for participatory and inclusive citizen-based governance, and therefore it is essential to analyze and ask:

- ♦ have adequate institutional spaces been created to allow participation by the poor, women, and marginalized citizens in governance?
- ♦ whether the poor, women, and marginalized citizens are able to capture the new governance spaces that have opened up at the local level? and
- ♦ what variables and impediments constrain the poor, women, and marginalized groups from capturing these new governance spaces?

Answering these questions will help assess the degree to which new governance spaces have become available and the extent to which these new governance spaces are inclusive of the poor, women, and the marginalized, which is a necessary precondition for heightened pro-poor accountability. Answering these questions will also help in the design of second-generation policies that strengthen devolution as a pro-poor reform.

### 1.3.3 Contribution of the Study

This study makes an important contribution to the policy literature and debate on poverty because it directly estimates for the first time the relative degree of access that poor citizen cohorts have to (i) the electoral sphere, (ii) citizen-based service delivery bodies, and (iii) elected local-level representatives. The main empirical estimate uses a simple measure to quantify pro-poor accountability, that is, how well poor citizens are faring relative to the nonpoor in terms of these three accountability variables. As mentioned in Gazdar (2007),<sup>6</sup> rigorous quantitative measures and techniques are used to precisely define poverty scores and the poor cohort. The study does not stop at quantifying the relative access that the poor have, it also uses rigorous qualitative fieldwork to interpret quantitative results, thereby unraveling the impediments that the poor, women, and marginalized groups face in governance relationships with local-level elected representatives and when participating in citizen-based service delivery bodies (Gazdar 2005 [footnote 1], pp. 1–3).

The study hypothesizes that, in addition to poverty impediments to pro-poor accountability, it can arise from exogenous factors such as (i) the degree of socioeconomic inequality embedded in social structures, (ii) historical resource endowments, (iii) agro-ecological conditions, (iv) degrees of patriarchy, and (v) existing physical infrastructure; as well as from endogenous factors such as (i) property rights over land, (ii) access to land

<sup>6</sup> Gazdar, H. 2007. Rural Economy and Livelihoods in Pakistan. Thematic paper prepared under TA4319, Determinants and Drivers of Poverty Reduction and ADB's Contribution in Rural Pakistan. ADB, Islamabad.

through tenancy, (iii) possibilities of accessing the labor market through migration, (iv) differences in literacy and schooling attainments, and (v) dependence on landlord credit, etc. In addition to estimating the correlation between being poor and having access to different spheres of accountability, the study also estimates the effect each of the exogenous and endogenous drivers mentioned above has on pro-poor accountability in Pakistan.

### **1.3.4 Structure of the Study**

Section 2 of this paper introduces a conceptual framework that is used to analyze governance failures for the purpose of this study. This is followed by a description of the empirical strategy and research design. It also introduces the main questions that will be tested and analyzed in order to get a handle on the nature and causes of pro-poor governance failures in Pakistan. Section 3 describes the changes in the governance framework that have been brought about by Pakistan's recent devolution reforms. It highlights the need to interpret many of the findings of this study in the context of devolution. This section also sharpens many of the hypotheses that are introduced in the previous section. Section 4 describes the nature of the data used and introduces the reader to the fieldwork methodology. Sections 5 and 6 present the results of how well pro-poor governance is working in Pakistan and identify the impediments that continue to constrain the poor, women, and illiterate and socially marginalized citizens from holding the state accountable. Section 7 summarizes the findings of the study and makes some initial recommendations regarding the drivers of pro-poor governance in Pakistan.

## 2. Conceptualizing Governance Failures: A Framework and Empirical Strategy


### 2.1 World Development Report (2004) Governance Framework

The World Bank's (2004) *World Development Report*<sup>7</sup> has developed a rigorous framework that provides a useful starting point for an analysis of the weaknesses and strengths of governance relationships in specific contexts. The framework analyses the "governance relationship" in terms of relationships of accountability between four sets of actors that include (i) citizens and clients, (ii) politicians and policymakers, (iii) organizational providers, and (iv) frontline professionals. A schematic description of an ideal governance relationship (Figure 1) is as follows:

finances and budgetary control at their disposal (financial control). Citizens, in turn, have at their disposal electoral and other legal mechanisms that allow them to evaluate executive performance (information) and enable them to reward or penalize politicians' behavior (enforceability). The World Bank (2004) classifies this as the "long route of accountability" (Figure 1)—this captures more than the exercise of "voice" in the electoral sphere, although this, too, is an extremely important component. Besides electoral voice, the long route includes policy-directed actions and processes such as constitutional and judicial activism, media oversight, and lobbying.

Evidence from around the world suggests that citizens "are combining electoral accountability and participation with what would traditionally have been considered the official accountability activities of the state" (World Bank 2004 [footnote

Figure 1: Analyzing Governance



Source: World Bank. 2004. *World Development Report 2004, Making Services Work for Poor People*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

An ideal governance relationship is one where citizens choose representatives that form a government, are delegated the task of public service delivery (delegation), and have adequate

7], pp. 85–86). These initiatives increase accountability at various levels by strengthening citizen voice in and citizen oversight of government policies, projects and budgeting, and planning mecha-

<sup>7</sup> World Bank. 2004. *World Development Report 2004, Making Services Work for Poor People*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

nisms. Accountability is expected to be strengthened because these initiatives are supposed to give citizens not only greater “voice” but make them more informed about the actions of government, thus making concerted action among citizens easier (World Bank 2004 [footnote 7], pp. 86–89). However, it is important to recognize the following in the long route of accountability:

- ♦ Citizens hold politicians accountable by participating and competing in political and electoral process through formal (political parties or associations) and informal coalitions (caste groups, religious networks, and clan groups). Competition between these coalitions defines the collective objectives for public policy and public service delivery as each coalition attempts to influence politicians’ actions in their favor.
- ♦ The strength of the accountability relationship between politicians and the poor, women, and marginalized citizens depends on (i) whether these citizens have equal access to the electoral sphere, and (ii) whether they are able to create/participate in effective electoral coalitions that represent their interests.
- ♦ The ability of these citizens to hold politicians accountable to collective objectives depends on the efficacy of mechanisms of information generation and enforcement. This, in turn, depends on the existence of mechanisms that give citizens a greater participatory and oversight role in the formulation and execution of government policies, projects and budgeting, and planning mechanisms.

Informed citizen participation in the electoral sphere is, however, not sufficient to enforce accountability. Accountability also depends upon the compact between politicians/policymakers and organizational providers. For collective objectives to be translated into outcomes, policymakers have to delegate adequate powers, authorities, and resources to organizational service providers. In addition, they have to monitor the actions of organizational service providers and design com-

patible incentives for service providers to deliver on collective outcomes. However, it is important to recognize that effective and informed citizen participation in the electoral sphere will set incentives for politicians to design and enforce incentive compatible compacts. In this sense, the second rung of the accountability relationship is endogenous to the first one.

Moving down the accountability chain, organizational service providers have to create compatible incentives for frontline providers and manage their actions in a way that ensures the delivery of collectively mandated outcomes. The framework acknowledges that it may not be possible for policymakers/politicians to specify all actions in the compact nor may it be possible for all information to be revealed between citizens and politicians. Given these constraints, welfare can be enhanced by

- ♦ having citizens directly reveal information about their demands for services as clients,
- ♦ having them monitor and reward the actions of frontline providers, and
- ♦ allowing citizens to deliver services in collaboration with public service providers and to engage with these providers in a monitoring and oversight role.

This is classified as the short route of accountability, which envisages that frontline providers can be made directly accountable to clients by passing decisions and authorities directly to citizens and communities.

The key difference between the long and short routes of accountability as described here is the different relationship between citizens, frontline service providers, and executive and political representatives. The latter describes the relationship between citizens as clients and potential service providers, and the executive as the public service provider. In the long route, the emphasis is on the accountability of political representatives to citizens as electoral candidates and as formulators of government policy, projects, budgets, and plans.



## 2.2 Empirical Strategy to Measure Anti-Poor Accountability Failures

### 2.2.1 Focus of Empirical Strategy

Governance failures are defined as deviations from this ideal governance relationship and can occur along any of the routes taken by the accountability relationship described above. The emphasis of the study is on failures that occur along the first route of the governance relationship, i.e., along the long route. There are two reasons for this focus. First, as already mentioned, with the recent reforms, there is considerable lack of clarity with regard to mandates, control over finances, and jurisdictional authority between different tiers of governments. This makes it extremely difficult to analyze failures along the second and third routes of the accountability relationship, especially as the institutional structure itself is in transition.

Similarly, issues of institutionalization continue to plague the newly instituted citizen-based service delivery and oversight bodies, which makes it extremely hard to evaluate the weaknesses in the short route of accountability. However, with regard to the short route, this study asks a more limited question, i.e., to what degree are the poor, women, and marginalized and socially excluded citizens aware of these service delivery and oversight bodies and how does the level of awareness in these citizen types compare with other citizen types. Although, this is a much more restricted question, it gives us important insights into the process of institutionalization of these citizen-based bodies and how involved the poor, women, and marginalized and socially excluded citizens are in this process. It is also an important question to ask because local governments have completed their first electoral cycle at the time of this study.

Second, and more importantly, this study takes a micro-village and household-level perspective, which implies that the focus of the analysis is along routes where the citizen directly interfaces

with governance structures, and not on weaknesses in administrative compacts, structures, and procedures. Given this focus, an important caveat must be kept in mind when interpreting the results: how well a functioning long route of accountability might in and of itself fail to translate into pro-poor social delivery outcomes if it is offset by weaknesses in administrative compacts, structures, and procedures.

With this in mind, it is, nonetheless, important to recognize that a well-functioning long route of accountability for the poor will go a long way in redressing accountability failures in Pakistan's governance framework. Weaknesses in administrative compacts, structures, and procedures in the context of devolution have been rigorously analyzed by Charlton, et. al. (2005) study (footnote 2). The current study should be treated as a companion study that analyses the weaknesses in pro-poor accountability along the routes of interface between politicians and service providers and the poor, women, and marginalized citizens.

### 2.2.2 Variables and Empirical

#### Methodology

##### *Dependent Variables*

The study uses three dependent variables of access as proxy measures for pro-poor accountability:

- (i) access of different citizen types<sup>8</sup> to the electoral sphere,
- (ii) access of different citizen types to elected local-level representatives involved in planning and budgetary needs assessment, and
- (iii) access of different citizen types to citizen-based service delivery bodies.

These variables are first-order governance measures that capture the long and short routes of accountability that allow different citizen cohorts

<sup>8</sup> This study is concerned with the poor, women, and socially excluded and marginalized citizens.

to hold government, politicians, and service providers accountable through direct participation in citizen bodies, in planning and budgeting mechanisms, and through direct participation in the electoral sphere.

In addition, for a limited sample of villages, this study uses a fourth dependent variable to estimate the bias in the targeting of localized public good provision between elite and nonelite households by union *nazims* (mayors)/*naib nazims* (deputy mayors). Estimating biases in the targeting of localized public goods at the household level allows important insights into the nature of the long route of pro-poor accountability at the union council level. The emergence of anti-poor targeting biases will reveal that distortions exist not only in electoral accountability but also in the pro-poor nature of budgeting and planning mechanisms. The dependent variable used to estimate these biases is the post-devolution change in the provision of sanitation and soling (street paving) by local governments at the household level. This variable is generated by using pre-2001 baseline data on provision and comparing it to a current provision line. Household data for this exercise came from the village census instrument used by the present study as well as the Cheema and Mohmand (2005) survey instrument (footnote 5).

The main empirical strategy of the study is to analyze whether a positive correlation exists between being poor and the four dependent variables defined above. This provides a direct measure of pro-poor accountability. This empirical strategy is an important contribution to the Pakistani literature on governance as there is no study that directly estimates and analyzes the correlation between the poverty status of a household and its access to the electoral sphere and to mechanisms of planning and service delivery. This correlation is important from a policy viewpoint because it is imperative to analyze whether “the poor” as a category are systematically dis-

criminated against in participatory bodies, within the electoral sphere, in terms of access to local-level politicians, in planning and budgeting mechanisms, and in terms of the targeting of schemes. A negative and significant correlation between governance variables and being a poor household<sup>9</sup> should alert the policymaker to the immediacy of designing specific policies that are aimed at increasing the stake that the poor have in governance mechanisms.

### *Independent Variables*

This study, however, goes beyond this simple correlation as it recognizes that poverty is a multifaceted phenomenon and that there exist a number of exogenous and endogenous micro-drivers of pro-poor accountability. Table 2 lists the more important exogenous and endogenous micro-drivers of pro-poor accountability.<sup>10</sup>

In addition to analyzing the effect of poverty on governance measures, the study estimates the effect these other exogenous and endogenous drivers have on the four dependent variables that are being used as proxy measures to estimate the strength of the long and short routes of accountability. It is important to recognize that the micro-drivers/impediments listed in Table 2 can contribute to the weakening of the accountability relationship between citizens and government/politicians/service providers. This is likely to occur when these impediments (i) raise entry barriers for the poor, women, and the marginalized to participate in electoral, political, and planning processes; (ii) increase the costs of collective action for the poor, women, and socially excluded citizens; and (iii) impede the formation of horizontal class-based coalitions that represent the poor, women, and the marginalized.<sup>11</sup> Furthermore, anti-poor governance failures are likely if certain impediments raise the cost of accessing information on executive performance. Information constraints are more likely to be

9 For estimates of household-level poverty scores, rankings, and indices, see Gazdar (2007) (footnote 6).

10 For a wider discussion around the drivers of pro-poor change, see the references in Gazdar (2005) (footnote 1).

11 For the importance of class-based coalitions as a means to fight poverty in the Indian case, see Kohli, A. 1987. *The State and Poverty in India: The Politics of Reform*. Cambridge University Press.

**Table 2: Drivers of/Impediments to Pro-Poor Accountability**

Driver	Exogenous	Endogenous
Micro Drivers	<p>Socioeconomic inequality in social structures</p> <p>Historical resource endowments</p> <p>Agro-ecological conditions</p> <p>Patriarchy</p> <p>Existing social and physical infrastructure</p> <p>Membership of a dominant kinship group</p>	<p>Poverty</p> <p>Property rights over land</p> <p>Access to land through tenancy</p> <p>Access to income through the labor market</p> <p>Access to information through education</p> <p>Access to the labor market through migration</p> <p>Dependence on landlords for credit/homestead</p> <p>Electoral competition between patrons/political parties</p> <p>Existence of pro-poor political parties/electoral coalitions</p>

Source: Author's fieldwork.

binding if the poor lack easy access to information either because (i) they lack access to education or (ii) they lack access to networks that in turn have access to critical information on a politician's performance as well as budgeting and planning.<sup>12</sup>

The literature suggests that for the long route of accountability to work well, the poor, women, and socially excluded citizens must be able to:

- ♦ create political and electoral coalitions that represent their interests;
- ♦ freely participate in dominant coalitions that are representative of their needs and to voice their demands in these coalitions;
- ♦ exercise an independent vote and voice irrespective of whether they form class-based coalitions or cross-class representative coalitions;
- ♦ have access to information on politicians' behavior; and
- ♦ participate in budgeting and planning decisions.

Similarly, the impediments listed in Table 2 are likely to weaken the short route of accountability because of (i) weaknesses in selection and representation in client/user organizations; (ii) lack of awareness of and information on these organizations; and (iii) because the poor, women, and socially excluded households find it difficult to provide, access/interpret information on the performance of frontline providers.

The literature suggests that for the short route of accountability to work well, the poor, women, and socially excluded citizens must be able to:

- ♦ provide and access information on client bodies and the performance of service providers;
- ♦ participate and be represented in user/client bodies; and
- ♦ have access to and representation in client bodies that have effective mandates, mechanisms of enforceability, and access to finance.

These reasons highlight the need to estimate the direct effect that the impediments listed in Table 2 have on the study's measures of

<sup>12</sup> See: Bardhan, P., and D. Mookherjee. 2005. Introductory chapter to *Decentralization in Developing Countries: A Comparative Perspective*. Edited by P. Bardhan and D. Mookherjee. The MIT Press; Besley, T., R. Pande, L. Rahman, and V. Rao. 2001. *The Politics of Public Goods Provision: Evidence from Indian local governments*. Unpublished manuscript. London School of Economics and Political Science, London; Dreze and Sen (1996) (footnote 1); and Kohli (1987) (footnote 11).

accountability. An analysis of the constraints imposed by micro-drivers/impediments other than the poverty status of a household provides further information for a government on additional tools/instruments of intervention that it could use to strengthen the long and short routes of accountability, which, as mentioned earlier, are important prerequisites for strengthening the governance relationship between citizens and the state.

In order to test for the effects of these drivers, the study primarily uses the following control variables.

- ♦ **Land ownership.** This variable simply measures the quantity of land owned by a household. Gazdar (2007) shows that the quantity of land owned is an important negative correlate of poverty (footnote 6).
  - ♦ **Dominant Kinship Group Status.** This variable simply identifies whether a household belongs to a kinship group that was historically recognized as the dominant kinship group in the village. It is important to note that the study is making no assumptions about the current socioeconomic status of the kinship group, which makes this a purely exogenous variable. In fact, Gazdar (2007) not only describes the village-level hierarchy of kinship groups, he also documents cases where historically dominant kinship groups continue to dominate, as well as cases where socially and economically mobile groups have started to contest the dominance of these groups at the village level (footnote 6).
  - ♦ **Proportion of literate adults (male and female) in a household.** Again, Gazdar (2007) shows that literacy is an important correlate of poverty and that literacy attainment tends to vary considerably between dominant and non-dominant kinship groups (footnote 6). However, he also documents cases of mobility that reveal a break in the one-to-one correspondence between social status and literacy. Literacy is also thought to be important
- because it is an asset that gives households the ability to absorb and process crucial political and administrative information.
- ♦ **Village fixed effects.** The study includes village fixed effects because Gazdar (2007) shows that considerable variation exists in the sample between village-level socioeconomic structures and between historical patterns of socioeconomic mobility (footnote 6). It is, therefore, important to control for inter-village variation when estimating the effect of independent variables.
  - ♦ **Other variables.** The study controls for a number of other variables that capture the exogenous and endogenous micro-drivers mentioned above, such as occupation, tenancy status, and female ownership of land, etc.

### 3 Devolution and the Long and Short Routes of Accountability

Pakistan’s recent devolution reforms have instituted a number of governance changes that are expected to strengthen the direct long and short routes of accountability for citizens at the grassroots level. This section briefly describes these important reforms. It is important to understand the nature of these reforms because devolution provides the context for the new accountability framework between citizens and the state in Pakistan. However, in line with the study’s research design, this document only describes the important changes that have occurred at the direct interface between state and citizenry.

#### 3.1 Empowering the Union


By far the most significant change has

been the strengthening of the union as a foundation of the local state. The union council is the only directly elected tier of a more empowered local government system (Figure 2). Nazims, naib nazims, and councilors are directly elected at the union level, which is a multimember ward consisting of an agglomeration of villages. Although the multi-ward nature of union elections means that there is no village-level reservation in the union councils, seats are, nonetheless, reserved for women, minorities, laborers, and peasants.

Reforms at the union level are expected to strengthen the long route of accountability in a number of ways:

- (i) The introduction of elections is expected to expose the old local-level unelected patron to electoral competition and, thus, create a direct link of accountability between these patrons and the union-level citizenry.

Figure 2: Electoral Linkages



Source: Author’s fieldwork.


13 A tehsil is an administrative unit of local government, between a district and union.

- (ii) The mechanism of reservation is expected to increase accountability to the marginalized and powerless through the mechanism of direct representation.
- (iii) Not only does political bargaining over development funds now occur between levels (the union and the district/*tehsil*<sup>13</sup>) that are closer to citizens, all the actors involved in this bargaining are either directly or indirectly elected and, therefore, accountable to their voters (Figures 2 and 3).

union naib nazims are ex-officio members of the tehsil council (Figure 3). The political and electoral integration of the union into higher tiers of government allows union nazims and naib nazims to play a critical role in the allocation of funds and projects across villages and social groups in their respective unions for two reasons.

While union nazims/naib nazims can now monitor the spatial allocation of the district/*tehsil* budgets directly in their role as district/*tehsil* councilors, the *tehsil* administration

**Figure 3: Interlinked Representation**



Source: Author's fieldwork.

Even more importantly, at least in theory, union councilors and the union executive are now in a position to hold a much more empowered, higher-tier, local government executive accountable because of the manner in which the union has been integrated into the higher tiers of local government. First, union nazims, naib nazims, and councilors constitute the electoral college for the district/*tehsil* nazims, naib nazims, and councilors elected on reserved seats at these higher levels (Figure 2). Second, union nazims are ex-officio members of the district council and


and district government do not currently have the capacity to “monitor” and “verify” the use of development funds for localized public goods (such as sanitation and soling) by union representatives at the local level. This gives union nazims and naib nazims considerable “authority” and “autonomy” over the allocation of funds and projects for localized public goods within the union. In fact, the current practice of dividing claims over the district and *tehsil* development budgets between union nazims and union naib nazims, respectively, is similar to the way in which mem-

ber of national/provincial assembly grants work (Figure 4).

Under the current reform, an “institutional gap” remains in that neither citizens nor individual *mauzas/dehs* or *pinds/goths* participate directly in budgeting, development planning, and the selection of schemes.<sup>14</sup> The direct participation of *mauzas/dehs* and *pinds/goths* was to have been

plans, and schemes at the time that union nazims, naib nazims, and councilors are to be elected (Figure 4). Apart from this, whatever contact individual citizens have with union, tehsil, and district representatives to convey their developmental needs is “informal” and “ad hoc” and this access is likely to be asymmetric between different citizen types. Furthermore, this input is not binding on a government.

Figure 4: Electoral and Budgetary Linkages



Source: Author's fieldwork.

made operational through the enactment of village and neighborhood councils (VNCs), which, to date, have not been made active in spite of the fact that the Local Government Ordinance (2001) provides for their existence. This “institutional gap” means that citizens can only exercise voice over satisfaction with local government budgets,


After the elections, citizens have little or no direct oversight role or participation in the formulation and execution of union, tehsil, and district government budgets and plans. Furthermore, given that unions are multi-village electoral wards, it is possible for whole villages to end up having no representatives in the union

14 A revenue village, also called a mauza (in Punjab and NWFP) or deh (in Sindh), is the lowest defined geographic unit with a jurisdiction list number for the purposes of revenue. A revenue village may be populated or depopulated. A hamlet/village, also called a goth (in Sindh) or pind (in Punjab), is a consolidated geographic settlement of citizens that is known to them as a village. A hamlet/village may be the same as a revenue village or there may be more than one hamlet in a revenue village. As a rule of thumb, a hamlet/village is always populated. The other interesting difference is that, while a revenue village has administratively defined physical boundaries, the boundaries of a hamlet/village are invariably defined by its inhabitants.

council and, as a result, no say over the budgetary and planning process for a particular electoral cycle. This is in contrast to experiments of direct citizen participation in West Bengal and Kerala in India, and Porte Algre in Brazil, where citizens have a direct role in budget formulation and oversight (Figure 5) (Ghatak and Ghatak 2002,<sup>15</sup> and World Bank 2004 [footnote 7], pp. 78–94). Citizens can exercise some decision-making control over the citizen community board (CCB) component of the budget, but there is no enforceable requirement that the formulation of CCBs must involve or represent the wider village-level citizenry.

and efficient management of development funds depends largely on how accountable union nazims and naib nazims are to the union-level citizenry. The “institutional gap” in budgetary and planning processes means that citizens can only convey their developmental needs informally and that the process is likely to be ad hoc and need not allow equal access to all citizens. Furthermore, it is only at the time of elections that all citizens, irrespective of their type, have the opportunity to voice their satisfaction over the policies, plans, and budgets formulated by different local governments. Therefore, if direct elections at the union level increase the accountability of these represen-

**Figure 5: Participatory Budgeting in West Bengal**



Source: Ghatak, M., and M. Ghatak. 2002. Recent Reforms in the Panchayat System in West Bengal: Toward Greater Participatory Governance? *Economic and Political Weekly of India*. 5 January.

These reforms have clearly empowered union nazims and naib nazims in comparison with the pre-devolution system. However, to what extent this will result in the more equitable

tatives, one would expect to see increased equity and efficiency in the use of development funds at this level.

<sup>15</sup> Ghatak, M., and M. Ghatak. 2002. Recent Reforms in the Panchayat System in West Bengal: Toward Greater Participatory Governance? *Economic and Political Weekly of India* 37 (1).



However, if the union remains prone to elite capture, the expected results could show the persistence of inefficient spending and spatial and social inequity in the allocation of projects. Which effect holds is really an empirical question that this study partly attempts to address by asking (i) whether the poor, women, and marginalized groups face any barriers to entry in accessing the electoral sphere; (ii) to what extent these groups' voting decisions are based on influence and patronage; (iii) how easy it is for these groups to access union-level nazims/naib nazims and councilors in order to convey their developmental needs; and (iv) whether one can estimate patterns of bias in the targeting of localized public goods between elite and nonelite groups.

### 3.2 Engendering User Power and Citizens' Participation

The local government reforms have provided for institutional arrangements that foster citizen participation in service delivery and oversight, such as CCBs,<sup>16</sup> VNCs, and school councils (SCs). CCBs and VNCs have been enacted to enable citizens to directly participate in service delivery. Oversight bodies, such as SCs, have been created to empower citizens as "users" by giving them the authority to monitor and supervise local service providers. It is hoped that these bodies will increase the efficiency of project selection as well as the accountability of government service providers to the needs of citizens.

These new bodies are expected to strengthen the short route of accountability for the poor, women, and marginalized groups. However, a minimum assumption for this to happen is that citizens belonging to these groups must be aware of these institutional arrangements and there should be evidence suggesting that they have an equal chance of participating in these bodies relative to nonpoor, male, and elite groups. As pointed out earlier, the main emphasis of this

study is on the long route of accountability and it only asks this far more limited question with regard to the short route of accountability. However, to reiterate this is an important question as it provides insights into the process of institutionalization of citizen-based user bodies during the first electoral cycle of the newly empowered local governments.

This analysis is particularly pertinent because the field surveys for this study were conducted at the end of the first cycle of the devolution reforms, which was a good time to assess the performance of these bodies. In addition, the study asks whether the awareness of and participation in these bodies by the poor, women, and marginalized groups varies with (i) the type of village-level social structures, (ii) the degree of inequality of asset holding between groups, and (iii) the degree of socioeconomic exclusion at the village level.

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16 Qadir (2005) points out that CCBs are expected to play two roles: (i) give citizens a direct role in service delivery, and (ii) mobilize citizens to hold their representatives accountable. In this sense CCBs exist at the border of both the long and short routes of accountability. See: Qadir, A. 2005. *Straddling State and Society: Devolution and Pakistan's Ambiguous Associations*. Preparatory analytical paper prepared for ADB workshop. ADB, Islamabad.

## 4 Data and Fieldwork Methodology

Data for this study was collected in seven districts of Pakistan, using three main primary data-gathering instruments to collate the data. Districts were selected to represent Pakistan's different agro-ecological and socioeconomic regions. Four of the seven sample districts—(i) Toba Tek Singh in central Punjab, (ii) Muzaffargarh in southern Punjab, (iii) Mardan in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), and (iv) Sanghar in central Sindh—were picked from among districts where the main source of livelihood is irrigated crop farming. Nine-tenths of Pakistan's rural population resides in villages that correspond to these ecological and socioeconomic conditions. The district of Chakwal in northern Punjab was picked to capture issues of governance and poverty in a *barani* (rain-fed) agricultural zone. Upper Dir was sampled to represent the forestry areas in NWFP and Thatta to represent a coastal district on the Indus delta where the main source of livelihood is marine fishing.

Intra-district sampling reflects the objective of capturing features of interest within each district. In Muzaffargarh, villages from the Alipur and Jatoi tehsils were sampled to ensure that villages from the riverine plains of the Punjab had some representation. Within Dir, villages were sampled from the mountainous regions of Upper Dir to ensure that the sample was restricted to the forest-growing parts of the district. In order to increase the sample of districts from the NWFP plains, villages were selected from both the Mardan and Swabi districts. Within Thatta, the sample of villages was restricted to the coastal villages. For Sanghar, the arid *taluka* (subdistrict) of Khipro was dropped from the sample since the objective was to represent villages reliant on irrigated crop farming in Sindh. Finally, in the case of Toba Tek Singh and Chakwal, villages were randomly chosen from the entire district frame.

Having selected the district and subdis-

trict frame, a sample of 7% of revenue villages (footnote 14) was randomly selected in these areas from the 1998 Population Census village list (Government of Pakistan 2002).<sup>17</sup> In selecting villages, the study excluded very small (less than 300 persons) and very large (over 3,000 persons) villages from the 1998 Population Census village list. The final sample contains 61 revenue villages: 14 in Toba Tek Singh, 11 in Chakwal, 7 in Muzaffargarh, 7 in Upper Dir, 7 in Mardan/Swabi, 8 in Sanghar, and 7 in Thatta. Villages in Muzaffargarh, Sanghar, and Thatta contain numerous hamlets and, as a result, the overall hamlet sample is over 100.

The first survey instrument employed the technique of rapid community surveys, which was used in all 61 sample revenue villages. The survey collated information on infrastructure, social services, assets, land and tenancy, collective action, and governance. In each of the seven districts, a typical village was selected for in-depth work where a complete census was conducted using three instruments. These seven villages are referred to as census villages for the purpose of this study. The first instrument employed in-depth qualitative fieldwork around issues of labor markets, land ownership patterns, functioning of local democracy, and collective action. Particular attention was paid to documenting historical dynamics within and across village variations.

The scoping fieldwork provided information that was used to develop a village census instrument that, in turn, was used to collate data from all households in each of the seven villages. In villages comprising more than one settlement, the census was conducted in all the settlements constituting the revenue village. The census village questionnaire collated information on infrastructure provision, food consumption, assets, tenancy, patterns of wage labor, awareness of and participation in citizen-based participatory bodies, patterns and rationale of voting in local government elections, and meetings attended with union nazims/naib nazims and councilors to con-

<sup>17</sup> Government of Pakistan. 2002. *1998 Census Report of Pakistan*. Islamabad: Population Census Organization.

vey development needs. In addition, information on age, literacy, education, marital status, occupation, possession of national identity card, and voting was collated for each member of the household.

Apart from these instruments, the study's governance team collected qualitative data on governance and voting using key respondent and group interviews in the seven census villages as well as the 61 sample villages. This qualitative data provides rich information on underlying structures and processes, and has been used to interpret the findings from the quantitative data.

Some of the analysis in the study combines household-level survey data from four revenue villages in Jaranwala tehsil in Faisalabad district.<sup>18</sup> These revenue villages were randomly selected from a cluster of villages that lay within a 20-km-radius of Khurrianwala town, Jaranwala's fastest growing urban center. In this sense, these are revenue villages with a high degree of exposure to urbanization. Within each revenue village, a sample of 30% of households was surveyed. The 30% sample was randomly selected from a revenue village sampling frame that was stratified by kinship group. The survey instrument used by Cheema and Mohmand (2005) (footnote 5) was more comprehensive than the instrument used to conduct a census in each of the seven census villages. A similar survey methodology was used in both the Jaranwala survey and the seven census villages.

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<sup>18</sup> This data was collated by the author along with Ms Shandana Mohmand for the purposes of research. For details, see Cheema and Mohmand (2005) (footnote 5).

## 5 Analyzing the Long Route of Accountability in Pakistan

The study analyses the long route of accountability by examining the following:

- ♦ Is electoral participation of the poor and women in the recent union council elections in line with the participation levels of the non-poor and male cohorts? The study also analyzes whether the electoral participation of the poor and women varies with exogenous and endogenous micro-drivers, such as the type of village-level social structures, the degree of inequality of asset holding between groups, and the degree of socioeconomic exclusion at the village level.
- ♦ To what extent are these groups' voting decisions based on influence and patronage? The study analyzes the extent to which the decision to vote dependently or independently is contingent upon (i) differences in socioeconomic structures at the village level, (ii) the degrees of political competition within the area, (iii) the presence of political party activity, and (iv) the degree of political party competition.
- ♦ How easy is it for these groups to access union-level nazims/naib nazims and councilors in order to convey their development needs? Again, the study analyzes the extent to which access to union-level nazims/naib nazims is contingent upon (i) differences in socioeconomic structures at the village level, (ii) the

degree of inequality of asset holding between groups, and (iii) the degree of socioeconomic exclusion at the village level.

- ♦ What patterns of bias exist in the targeting of localized public goods between elite and nonelite groups? The point of interest is to examine how biases in targeting vary with (i) differences in socioeconomic structures at the village level, (ii) the degree of inequality of asset holding between groups, and (iii) the degree of socioeconomic exclusion at the village level.

### 5.1 Barriers to Entry in the Electoral Sphere for the Poor and Women

This section asks whether the barriers to entry in the electoral sphere are low for the poor and women, i.e., whether poor citizens and women are as likely to participate in the electoral sphere as males and nonpoor households. It also estimates whether other exogenous and endogenous micro-drivers constrain these citizens' decision to exercise their right to vote. As mentioned earlier, access to the electoral sphere is an essential precondition for a well-functioning long route of accountability.

#### 5.1.1 Voting and Gender

Table 3 shows that, in the census villages,<sup>19</sup> only approximately half the proportion of adult women voted in comparison to adult men. Qualitative fieldwork reveals that this statistic reflects social structural constraints that define

**Table 3: Male and Female Voting Turnout (%)**

Voted	Male	Female	Total
No	42.1	68.7	54.9
Yes	57.8	31.2	45.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Note: Figures may not add up to total because of rounding.  
Source: Author's fieldwork

<sup>19</sup> The term "census villages" refers to the seven villages in which a complete census was conducted by the ADB TA 4319-PAK field teams.

behavioral roles for women, which do not include their active participation in the electoral sphere (Mohmand and Gazdar 2007).<sup>20</sup> This suggests that the electoral sphere is suitably gendered, which effectively curtails the role women play in Pakistan’s politics. The concern is that a large part of Pakistan’s active political population does not participate in the act of voting. An even greater concern is that, given the current levels of female electoral participation, it is highly unlikely that governments (local, provincial, or national) will be responsive to the needs of women.

Table 4 shows that the patterns of women voting across the census villages is highly correlat-

preserve and perpetuate kinship groups (Mohmand and Gazdar 2007, footnote 20). In the case of villages such as Chakwal, where there is a much higher degree of social and physical mobility, the study finds that a large majority of women exercise their right to vote. Low levels of voting among women can also be an outcome of the way voting booths are located. Interviews revealed that women in the Thatta village chose not to vote in the 2005 local government elections—in spite of voting in previous elections—because no polling booth had been set up in their village.

The pattern of national identity card possession is equally gendered and mirrors the male-

**Table 4: Female Voting Turnout by Village (%)**

Village (in District)	No Vote	Vote	Total
Chakwal	33.33	66.67	100.00
Dir	97.27	2.73	100.00
Mardan	77.14	22.86	100.00
Muzaffargarh	66.15	33.85	100.00
Sanghar	63.91	36.09	100.00
Thatta	94.89	5.11	100.00
Toba Tek Singh	51.62	48.38	100.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>68.73</b>	<b>31.27</b>	<b>100.00</b>

Source: Author’s fieldwork

ed with the patterns of patriarchy documented in Mohmand and Gazdar (2007) (footnote 20). The results show that women are far less likely to vote in the NWFP districts and in Thatta, whereas they are much more likely to vote in Chakwal.

As argued in Mohmand and Gazdar (2007), the low propensity of voting among women in the Dir and Mardan villages is integrally linked to restricted patterns of physical and social mobility (footnote 20). Restricted patterns of physical and social mobility, in turn, appear to be related to patterns of endogamy that exist to

female divide found in voting patterns (Table 5). Interestingly, the relative incidence of identity card possession is much higher among women than is the exercise of the right to vote.

This finding is pushed into stark relief when one analyses the incidence of identity card possession at the village level. Table 6 shows that the lack of identity card possession does not explain low voter turnout among women in villages with extremely low female voting proportions. This suggests that lack of access to identity cards is not really an impediment to voting for

<sup>20</sup> Mohmand, S., and H. Gazdar. 2007. Social Structures in Rural Pakistan. Thematic paper prepared under TA4319, Determinants and Drivers of Poverty Reduction and ADB’s Contribution in Rural Pakistan. ADB, Islamabad.

**Table 5: Incidence of Male and Female National Identity Card Possession (%)**

Possession of Identity Card	Male	Female	Total
No	25.35	52.53	<b>38.46</b>
Yes	74.65	47.47	<b>61.54</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>100.00</b>

Source: Author's fieldwork.

approximately 16% of adult, voting-age women. This finding reinforces the argument in Mohmand and Gazdar (2007) that differences in patterns of patriarchy are an important part of the explanation for low levels of female voting turnout (footnote 20).

### 5.1.2 Voting, Women, and the Poor

The relationship between the poverty status of a household and voting turnout among women still needs to be analyzed, given that the relationship between poverty and accountability

**Table 6: Incidence of Female Identity Card Possession by Village (%)**

Village (in District)	No ID card	ID card	Total
Chakwal	29.63	70.37	100.00
Dir	58.02	41.98	100.00
Mardan	57.14	42.86	100.00
Muzaffargarh	61.02	38.98	100.00
Sanghar	46.22	53.78	100.00
Thatta	71.37	28.63	100.00
Toba Tek Singh	42.43	57.57	100.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>52.53</b>	<b>47.47</b>	<b>100.00</b>

Source: Author's fieldwork.

The important question to ask is whether there are systematic patterns in the type of women who vote. Multivariate results suggest that, within the group of voting women, literate women are 9% more likely to vote than illiterate women, although literate women are still almost 20% less likely to vote compared to illiterate men (Appendix, Table A.1, columns 1–3). The correlation between literacy and women's participation in the electoral sphere persists even after controlling for village fixed effects. This suggests that literacy does have a significant impact on the participation of women in the electoral sphere.

variables is the main question this study is designed to answer. Multivariate regression results suggest that the poverty status of a household is negatively and significantly related to women voting turnout at the household level (Appendix, Table A.1, columns 4–6). The results also suggest that female literacy is a highly significant positive correlate of female voting. Interestingly enough, the results suggest that, contrary to popular myth, women from dominant kinship groups are more likely to vote relative to others. Given the low levels of overall electoral participation by women, this suggests that dominant kinship groups are cognizant of the impor-

tance of not wasting votes that are in their control.

These results strongly suggest that increasing female literacy has a spillover benefit as it encourages women to participate in the electoral sphere. Therefore, if the aim of policymakers is to increase women’s participation in the electoral sphere, a medium-term goal must be to increase female literacy. However, the results also suggest that patterns of patriarchy embedded in the social structure are exogenous impediments to women’s participation in the electoral sphere.

### 5.1.3 Male Voting and the Poor

The data reveals a number of interesting findings about male voting patterns. Table 7 shows that the proportion of male voters is not much higher than 50%. The important question is whether there are systematic biases in the types of males who vote and those who do not. In line with the study’s empirical strategy, it starts by asking whether males from poor households are more or less likely to vote than males from non-poor households. Simple averages suggest that poor male voters vote in roughly the same proportion as nonpoor male voters across most of the sample villages.

other micro-drivers, poor households are, on average, less likely to vote than nonpoor households (Appendix, Table A.2, columns 1–3). The difference in order of magnitude also does not appear to be trivial. This suggests that it is more than at the margin that the poor are less likely to participate in the electoral sphere. Access to the electoral sphere appears to be structured in a way that discriminates against the poor. This result is further put into perspective by the finding that the decision to participate in voting at the household level is positively and significantly correlated with the household belonging to a dominant kinship group and with the proportion of literate male adults in a household. The latter effect is of a significantly large order of magnitude.

The result regarding the dominant kinship group is interesting because, as described by Gazdar (2007), some of these groups are no longer dominant in a social and economic sense in the census villages (footnote 6). The fact that the coefficient on the dominant kinship group dummy is positive and significant after controlling for village fixed effects suggests that, irrespective of their current position in specific villages, these groups are likely to dominate the local-level electoral sphere.

**Table 7: Proportion of Male Adults who Voted (%)**

Village (in District)	Nonpoor	Poor
Chakwal	47.19	58.22
Dir	26.12	27.18
Mardan	34.16	37.76
Muzaffargarh	39.68	34.69
Sanghar	33.06	30.19
Thatta	57.54	41.39
Toba Tek Singh	44.96	34.69
<b>Total</b>	<b>38.37</b>	<b>36.42</b>

Source: Author’s fieldwork.

However, regression analysis shows that, after controlling for village fixed effects and for

Putting together these results suggests that members of a (i) poor, (ii) nondominant kin-

ship group, and (iii) illiterate household are far less likely to participate in the electoral sphere and exercise their right to vote. These are precisely the types of households the study considers socially excluded and marginalized. The results regarding possession of identity cards mirror the results for male voting (Appendix, Table A.2, columns 4–6).

Again from a policy perspective, if the aim is to increase participation in the electoral sphere as a medium-term goal, then increasing literacy appears to be an important policy variable. In addition, it becomes necessary to support social mobilization efforts that aim to catalyze participation in the electoral sphere by poor households from nondominant kinship groups.

## 5.2 Dependent Voters and Pro-Poor Accountability

The previous section argues that women, the poor, and illiterate and nondominant kinship group households face differential access to the electoral sphere relative to male, nonpoor, and literate and dominant kinship group households. The political economy literature, however, is replete with examples that suggest that the act of voting may itself be circumscribed for groups that are in relations of social and economic dependence, such as the landless, tenants, and socially excluded groups.<sup>21</sup> The argument is that the voting decision of these groups is defined by relations of dependence that constrain their exercise of choice when voting. In defining dependent voting, the study follows Alavi's (1971) definition, "In making his (voting) choice, he (voter) must act within the constraints imposed on him by his situation (position) in the social structure of the village" (footnote 21, p. 112). For example, landless agricultural servants without homestead rights who reside on a landlord's land are more likely to vote in line with the landlord's expectations as compared to self-cultivators with secure homestead

rights. Therefore, it is important to analyze whether or not relations of dependent voting exist in the sample villages and which groups of voters are more prone to dependent voting.

The analysis of dependent voting was conducted in three parts and by combining quantitative and qualitative field research methodologies. The census questionnaire included a question on the rationale behind a household's decision to vote. The response options included:

- (i) trust in the individual being voted for,
- (ii) political party affiliation,
- (iii) relationship with an influential person of the area,
- (iv) relationship with an influential member of the village,
- (v) decision after consultation with family members, and
- (vi) decision under pressure from a notable(s).

The study ran regressions with each of these options as the dependent variable and with the following as independent variables: (i) poverty status of a household, (ii) membership of a dominant kinship group, (iii) landownership, (iv) village fixed effects, and (v) other controls. The regression estimates provide two important pieces of information.<sup>22</sup> First, they allow one to identify which reason(s) for voting dominates in each of the census villages. Second, they allow one to see which reasons for voting are significantly correlated with a respondent belonging to a poor household, a literate household, and a dominant kinship group household,<sup>23</sup> holding village differences in reasons for voting constant.

As the first step, each economically and statistically significant regression coefficient(s) was entered into a table (footnote 22) against a vil-

21 See: Alavi, H. 1971. The Politics of Dependence: A Village in West Punjab. *South Asian Review* 4 (2); Cheema and Mohmand (2005) (footnote 5); and Kohli (1987) (footnote 11).

22 The estimates are available from the author on request.

23 These were the only variables of significance in our regressions.



lage name—this allows us to see the important and significant regression coefficients at the village level at a glance. This voting choice table (footnote 22) creates a village-level matrix that documents the significant reason(s) for voting found in each village.

The second step in the analysis was to interpret the meaning of each of the six voting choice variables in each village using qualitative fieldwork techniques. Key respondent and small group interviews were conducted to analyze the villagers' interpretation of each of the choice-to-vote variables in each village. The idea was to understand what "trust in an individual" means in the Chakwal village as opposed to the Mardan village. Is the notion of trust one of free choice or does it reflect a relationship of dependence? The qualitative interpretation of these variables was then entered into the voting choice table mentioned earlier, which provides village-level snapshots of households' reasons for voting.

In addition, the voting choice table reports significant regression coefficients on the following independent variables: (i) poverty status of a household, and (ii) membership of a dominant kinship group.<sup>24</sup> These entries provide tabular information on what drives the decision to vote among poor, literate, and dominant kinship group households. A separate table is used to develop a typology of dependent voting at the village level as well as to analyze the rationale behind the voting decisions of poor, literate, and dominant kinship group households. This voting typology table is presented in the next section and is the main basis for analyzing dependent voting.

The third step in the analysis is to compare the typology of dependent voting developed through the voting typology table with degrees of socioeconomic inequality at the village level. The typology of socioeconomic inequality at the village level was developed using the information presented in Gazdar (2007) (footnote 6). This comparison allows us to analyze the manner in

which social structure types create relations of dependence in the electoral sphere. This analysis is important because it allows us to identify structural impediments to the long route of pro-poor accountability.

### 5.2.1 Voting Typology Table

The voting typology table shows that poor households are far more likely to vote because of pressure exerted on them by influential people, and less likely to vote in consultation with influential village members or because of strong party affiliations. These results strongly suggest that poor households are more likely to act as dependent voters in comparison with nonpoor households. This suggests that there is a great likelihood that the votes of poor households will be discounted even if they are active in the electoral sphere. Table 8 also shows that the poor are more likely to be de-linked from political parties relative to nonpoor households and, in certain contexts, this can reinforce dependence at the local level.

As opposed to this, dominant kinship group households are more likely to vote in consultation with influential village members and less likely to vote because of external pressure. As mentioned earlier, the study's dominant kinship group variable captures membership in a group that was historically recognized as the dominant group in the village. This variable makes no adjustment for the current socioeconomic status of the household or group. Given this definition, these results are quite intriguing. Gazdar (2007) has documented evidence of considerable socioeconomic mobility among nondominant kinship groups in Chakwal, Muzaffargarh, and Sanghar (footnote 6). One would expect this evidence of socioeconomic mobility among nondominant kinship groups to have weakened any strong and significant statistical association between being a member of a dominant kinship group and voting in consultation with the village influential. However, the study finds not only that the rela-

<sup>24</sup> These were the only two variables of significance in the voting choice regressions.

tionship is positive, it is also statistically and economically significant. This suggests that the local electoral sphere is quite likely dominated by the dominant kinship group in alliance with influential member(s) of the village. However, an important question is whether we find variations in the typology of voting choices across village types and whether there is a correlation between socioeconomic mobility and inequality at the village level and the prevalence of dependent and influence-based voting. This question is taken up in the next section.

ly to be low in Chakwal and Dir, but unambiguously high in Sanghar. If dependent voting is an outcome of extreme levels of poverty, it is expected to be high in Thatta and Muzaffargarh as well. Finally, dependent and influence-based voting is also likely to be high in Toba Tek Singh and Mardan if social inequality matters. In the next section, the study uses information from its qualitative surveys, the voting typology table (Table 8), and village indicators table (Table 9) to analyze whether correlations exist between village-level socioeconomic inequality and dependent voting.

**Table 8: Voting Typology Table**

Statistically Significant Rationale for Voting by Village and Group			
Chakwal	Trust in area influential(s)		
Dir	Political party affiliation	Trust in candidate	
Mardan	Influence of village influential(s)	Consultation with village influential(s)	Consultation with family
Muzaffargarh	Consultation with village influential(s)	Trust in area influential(s)	
Sanghar	Political party affiliation	Consultation with area and village influential(s)	
Thatta	Trust in area influential(s)		
Toba Tek Singh	Trust in village influential(s)		
Poor	Pressure of influential(s)	Less likely to consult village influential(s)	Less likely to vote because of political party affiliation
Dominant Kinship Group	More likely to vote in consultation with village influential(s)	Less likely to vote because of the pressure of influential(s)	

Source: Author's fieldwork.

In order to contextualize this analysis, Table 9 provides a summary of village-level socioeconomic variables. Rows 1 and 2 of the table draw up a typology of social and economic inequality at the village level. Given these indicators, dependent and influence-based voting is like-

**Table 9: Village Indicators**

Indicator	Chakwal	Dir	Mardan	Muzaff argarh	Sanghar	Thatta	Toba Tek Singh
Social inequality(difference in poverty headcounts between socially excluded and dominant castes)	More equal	More equal	Unequal	More equal	Highly unequal	More equal	Highly unequal
Economic inequality	Small equal	Small equal	Medium unequal	Medium unequal	Large unequal	Large unequal (agriculture highly unproductive)	Medium unequal
Cross-village poverty (headcount)	Low	Low	Low	High	Medium-High	Very high	Medium
Mean landownership in landowning class (acres)	3.9	0.8	1.9	1.1	5.1	5.1	1.8
Standard deviation	5.2	1.3	6.0	2.1	31.4	22.0	3.1
Max. land owned (acres)	30.2	8.5	30.0	15.0	500.0	200.0	30.0
Cultivating others' land (%)	31.8	2.8	34.7	17.9	66.2	3.3	12.7
Landless (%)	29.4	14.2	77.7	52.2	62.4	83.1	54.4
Illiterate males (%)	40.0	42.0	16.0	52.0	58.0	65.0	17.0
DFServants on others' land (%)	36.0	3.3	34.0	57.0	42.0	2.2	38.0
Illiterate females (%)	45.6	53.0	40.0	63.0	76.0	74.0	16.6
Agricultural productivity	Low	Low	High	High	High	Low	High
Cross-village extreme poverty (headcount)	2.6	3.2	3.2	35.6	15.1	53.9	10.0
Cross-village middle poverty (headcount)	16.7	15.1	25.5	65.7	32.1	79.3	26.3
Nonfarm earners (%)	3.5	13.0	13.0	14.0	9.0	41.0	11.0
Casual labor (%)	15.1	15.0	22.0	31.0	9.0	55.0	17.1
Migrant labor (international) (%)	0.0	31.4	10.7	0.2	0.0	0.0	2.0
Migrant labor (domestic)(%)	0.7	2.7	8.3	4.4	0.3	0.6	2.5

Source: Author's fieldwork.

### 5.2.2 Village Correlations

#### *Chakwal*

Chakwal is a case of dependent voting where the entire village votes for an area landlord who dominates national politics. Voting is classified as dependent because the landlord controls a monopoly vote faction that dominates the entire

cluster of villages in the area and there are no outside voting options available to villagers. However, villagers do not see this dependence on their landlord as an outcome of coercion, instead it is seen as a way of signaling their loyalty to a benevolent patron. Therefore, voting in the Chakwal village is typed as area-level, patron-client dependent voting.

Interestingly, Chakwal's village indicators would suggest a low dependent voting village, but the existence of a higher-level monopoly vote bloc dominated by an area influential recreates patterns of dependent voting in a village with otherwise low socioeconomic inequality and low poverty. This suggests that the existence of higher-tier monopoly voting factions is associated with dependent voting irrespective of the underlying socioeconomic conditions of the area.

### *Dir*

Low levels of socioeconomic inequality and poverty in Dir have provided the foundation for the exercise of free and independent electoral choice. Clusters of households vote together and switching for and between candidates has been a norm in Dir. Competitive political party electoral activity reinforces the practice of independent voting. Political party affiliations are an important reason for supporting a candidate. However, we were repeatedly told that the character of an individual matters as much as the party the candidate is affiliated with. Voting in Dir is typed as familial nondependent voting.

### *Mardan*

Voting in the Mardan village is also typed as village-level, patron-client dependent voting. A monopoly vote bloc of the dominant Mohmand kinship group prevails over village politics in spite of the existence of competitive politics at the higher tiers. Dependence on land and clan affiliations are the main reasons for villagers' electoral allegiance to the Mohmand vote bloc.

### *Muzaffargarh*

Low levels of socioeconomic inequality in Muzaffargarh have created preconditions of independent voting as no one landlord or faction dominates the village. Qualitative fieldwork suggests that households are fairly independent in their voting decisions and tend to switch their support between the two village-level factions based on their own judgments about the benefits of backing particular candidates. Independent voting is

further catalyzed by the prevalence of competitive factions at the higher tiers. The combination of low levels of socioeconomic inequality and competitive higher-tier politics has translated into political mobility for nondominant kinship groups. Voting in Muzaffargarh is, therefore, typed as familial nondependent voting.

### *Sanghar*

Given the levels of poverty and high degree of socioeconomic inequality, one would expect Sanghar to be a stark case of dependent voting. However, two factors have reduced the tendency towards dependent voting here. First, as described in Gazdar (2007), there have been strong signs of socioeconomic mobility among members of some of the nondominant kinship groups (footnote 6). Opportunities and patterns of socioeconomic mobility have translated into political independence because of the highly active presence of a national-level populist political party. The combination of socioeconomic change and high-intensity political party competition has translated into political mobility for some members of some of the nondominant kinship groups. These groups have emerged as independent voters.

In parallel, however, there are other nondominant kinship groups that remain tied to the large landlords' land and are dependent on them economically. Members of these groups continue to vote as dependent client voters. In order to capture these parallel realities, we have typed voting in Sanghar as competitive, patron-client, and party-based semi-dependent voting.

### *Thatta*

Unlike Dir and Muzaffargarh, low levels of social inequality have not produced a tendency towards independent voting in Thatta. However, like Chakwal, Thatta is a case of dependent voting where the entire village votes for a political influential who dominates district and national politics. Voting is classified as dependent because the influential controls a monopoly vote faction that dominates the entire cluster of villages in the area

and there are no outside options available to villagers. However, villagers do not see this dependence on their landlord as an outcome of coercion, instead it is seen as a signal of loyalty to a benevolent patron. Therefore, voting in the Thatta village is typed as area-level, patron-client, dependent voting.

### Toba Tek Singh

Toba Tek Singh is also a case of dependent voting. The politics of the village is dominated by two vertically hierarchical dominant kinship group factions. Nonlandlord kinship groups and the Musalli kinship group vote for their own landlord's faction. Bonds of economic dependence based on unequal landownership and a highly unequal social hierarchy recreate dependency in the electoral sphere. The bonds of economic dependency result in dependent voting in spite of the existence of competitive factions within the village and at the higher levels. Voting in the Toba Tek Singh village is typed as village-level, patron-client, dependent voting.

### 5.2.3 Conclusion

Village case studies suggest the existence of a weak correlation between socioeconomic inequality and the existence of dependent patron-client voting. The correlation is weakened because political conditions are equally important determinants of the existence of dependent patron-client voting. The nature of the correlation is summarized in Table 10.

Table 10 reveals three prominent relationships between voting types and their determinants:

- (i) Where socioeconomic inequality is highly unequal and personality-based politics dominates, dependent village-level patron-client voting prevails. This relationship exists in both Toba Tek Singh and Mardan. In these cases, dependent voting persists in spite of the existence of competitive higher tier factions.
- (ii) The cases of Dir and Muzaffargarh suggest that, where socioeconomic inequality is low

**Table 10: Type of Voting and Potential Determinants**

Item	Chakwal	Dir	Mardan	Muzaffargarh	Sanghar	Thatta	Toba Tek Singh
Voting type	Dependent area-level patron-client	Familial nondependent	Dependent village-level patron-client	Familial non-dependent	Competitive patron-client and party-based semi-dependent	Dependent area-level patron-client	Dependent village-level patron-client
Social inequality <sup>a</sup>	More equal	More equal	Unequal	More equal	Highly unequal	More equal	Highly unequal
Economic inequality	Small equal	Small equal	Medium unequal	Medium unequal	Large unequal	Large unequal (agriculture highly unproductive)	Medium unequal
Political party activism	Low	High	Low	Medium	High	Low	Low
Personality-based politics	High	Medium	High	High	Medium-High	High	High
Competitive high-tier factions	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes

a Difference in poverty headcounts between socially excluded and dominant castes.

Source: Author's fieldwork.

and competitive higher-tier factions dominate, we should expect independent voting to prevail.

(iii) However, low levels of socioeconomic inequality are not sufficient to ensure independent voting if it is combined with monopoly higher-tier factions and personality-based politics. This occurs in the cases of Chakwal and Thatta.

Sanghar represents an intermediate case and combines features of the three cases detailed above.

The analysis in this section suggests that the long route of pro-poor accountability will be weak for the following reasons:

- ◆ Poor households are more likely to act as dependent voters than nonpoor households, irrespective of the type of village. This suggests that there is a great likelihood that the votes of poor households will be discounted even if they are active in the electoral sphere.
- ◆ Dominant kinship groups are more likely to vote in consultation with village-level influential(s). This suggests that the more localized the politics the more likely it will be dominated by a concert of dominant kinship groups and village-level influential(s).
- ◆ Voters in villages with high levels of socioeconomic inequality and prevalence of personality-based politics are more likely to be dependent voters.
- ◆ Voters in villages that are dominated by monopolist higher-tier factions are more likely to be dependent voters.

As opposed to this, low levels of socioeconomic inequality, competitive higher-tier politics, and high degrees of local-level political party activism appear to be important preconditions for strengthening the long route of pro-poor accountability.

### 5.3 Do the Poor Have Equal Access to Union Nazims and Councilors?

For the long route of accountability to work well, it is important that politicians are in regular contact with the poor, women, and marginalized citizens to ascertain their development needs. Formal decentralized mechanisms of participatory budgeting such as the Gram Sabhas have worked well in parts of India<sup>25</sup> and appear to have had a positive impact in terms of poor citizens' participation in budgetary decision making. Unfortunately, mechanisms of participatory or citizen-based budgeting have not been instituted in Pakistan at the union council or village-level until now. As pointed out earlier, it was hoped that VNCs would play this role but these councils were not made operational during the first cycle of devolution. Direct village-level or citizen participation in budgeting and planning is an "institutional gap" in Pakistan's current local governance system.

The current practice with regard to citizen-based budgeting is that union councils, as citizen representatives, have to approve development schemes for the union even if they are financed from the development budgets of the district or tehsil. Qualitative fieldwork suggests that this requirement is not strictly followed and, in practice, the selection of schemes is done by the union nazims/naib nazims depending on whether the funds for the scheme come from the district or tehsil. Furthermore, a part of the development budget of these higher tiers of local government is allocated to general, minority, women, and *kissan* (farmer)/labor councilors directly and in these cases there is no requirement that the union council approve the development scheme. The union council only appears to fulfill an oversight role with regard to its development budget. Since a large part of the finances for development schemes come from the higher tiers of local government, it is important to assess how the union nazim/naib nazim and councilors actually assess

<sup>25</sup> See: Besley, et. al. (2001) (footnote 12); and Chattopadhyay, R., and E. Duflo. 2003. The Impact of Reservation in the Panchayati Raj: Evidence From a Nationwide Randomized Experiment. Typescript. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge.

the "needs" of the villagers. This is particularly important with regard to schemes for localized public goods, such as sanitation and soling, where higher-tier local governments really do not have sufficient information about the spatial distribution and historic spread of these schemes at the village and household level because of a paucity of information databases.

### 5.3.1 Estimating Access

Our qualitative fieldwork reveals that the process followed by the union nazim/naib nazim and councilors to assess the needs of villagers is

completely ad hoc and informal. The worry is that, given the ad hoc and informal nature of the process, there may be a systemic anti-poor bias in access to the union nazim/naib nazim and councilors for the purposes of conveying development needs, resulting in the needs of the poor not being counted in a systematic fashion. To put it differently, if the expected result holds, then it would imply that the needs of the poor are unlikely to be integrated systematically into the planning process.

Given this context, it is critical to esti-

**Table 11: Respondents Reporting Contact with Union *Nazim/Naib Nazim* to Convey Needs in the Last 6 Months**  
(%)

Village (in District)	No	Yes	Total
Chakwal	58.04	41.96	100.00
Dir	85.48	14.52	100.00
Mardan	90.46	9.54	100.00
Muzaffargarh	91.96	8.04	100.00
Sanghar	91.73	8.27	100.00
Thatta	82.82	17.18	100.00
Toba Tek Singh	88.74	11.26	100.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>87.70</b>	<b>12.30</b>	<b>100.00</b>

*Naib nazim* = deputy mayor, *nazim* = mayor.  
Source: Author's fieldwork.

**Table 12: Respondents Reporting Contact with Union Councilors to Convey Needs in the Last 6 Months**  
(%)

Village (in District)	No	Yes	Total
Chakwal	74.13	25.87	100.00
Dir	82.24	17.76	100.00
Mardan	92.70	7.30	100.00
Muzaffargarh	90.42	9.58	100.00
Sanghar	90.79	9.21	100.00
Thatta	86.49	13.51	100.00
Toba Tek Singh	91.24	8.76	100.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>88.87</b>	<b>11.13</b>	<b>100.00</b>

Source: Author's fieldwork.

mate the number of respondents reporting participation in informal meetings where they shared information on development, infrastructure, and social service needs with union nazims/naib nazims and councilors. Table 11 shows that, within the pooled village data, only a small minority of respondents reported attending such informal meetings. Chakwal, which is a relatively high-equality village in our sample (see previous section), is the only village where the reported incidence of these meetings tends to be high. The results for councilor meetings mirror the results for the union nazim/naib nazim meetings (Table 12). This suggests that the activity of needs planning is far from participatory and inclusive and is considerably de-linked from the village community.

### 5.3.2 Extent of Anti-Poor Bias

A more serious concern is whether there is a systemic anti-poor bias in the identity of the small minority of respondents reporting that they had attended such meetings with union nazims/naib nazims and councilors. Multivariate results (Appendix, Table A.3, columns 1–3) show that there is indeed a systemic anti-poor bias in the respondents who reported attending such meetings. The results suggest that the poor are less likely to report attending these meetings in comparison with the nonpoor. The results also show that the proportion of literate adults in a household is an extremely strong and positive correlate for attending these meetings. Interestingly, belonging to the dominant kinship group is not an advantage to respondents when it comes to attending these meetings. The results for councilor meetings echo these results (Appendix, Table A.3, columns 4–6).

These findings suggest that the voices of illiterate and poor households are systemically less likely to be counted in the assessment of needs in the planning process. Unless there are systemic interventions to formulate planning procedures and needs assessment procedures that ensure that

the voices of these groups are counted, it is most likely that the needs of the most vulnerable will count the least in the development planning process.

## 5.4 Patterns of Bias in the Targeting of Localized Public Goods

### 5.4.1 Why is Measuring the Targeting Bias Insightful?

Previous sections show that the poor, illiterate male and female citizens, and citizens from nondominant kinship groups are on average less likely to participate in the electoral sphere to exercise their right to vote. We have also seen that illiterate and poor households are less likely to be part of the network around union nazims/naib nazims and councilors and hence less likely to have their needs counted in the development process. This is the result of an “institutional gap” that prevents citizens and villages from having a direct role in budgetary and planning processes. Finally, Section 5.2 has argued that the probability of a citizen acting as a dependent voter is contingent upon (i) the existence of high degrees of socioeconomic inequality at the village level, (ii) the lack of political party activism, and (iii) monopolization of the political space by an area influential. This suggests that the long route of accountability is weak for the poor, women, and illiterate households, especially in villages where these conditions pertain. This gives rise to the expectation that, in these circumstances, we would expect the targeting of localized public goods to be biased in favor of elite groups in villages where the three conditions mentioned above hold.

This is more likely to be the case for localized public goods because the higher tiers of local government lack the information databases that capture information on the allocation and existence of these schemes, which gives considerable discretion to union nazims/naib nazims in scheme targeting.<sup>26</sup> Given that the long route of accountability appears to be weak at the union

<sup>26</sup> This is unlikely to be the case with a school building/health facility whose location and existence is much easier to verify.



level, we would expect an anti-poor bias in scheme targeting. As pointed out earlier, the long route of accountability is weak because of the anti-poor bias in the local-level electoral, planning, and budgeting spheres.

Furthermore, qualitative field visits revealed that higher-tier staff rarely visited the census villages and when, and if, visits are made, no formal mapping is undertaken. This information gap, combined with the fact that a higher-tier councilor's union nazims/naib nazims have control over development funds and are not answerable to citizens except at the time of elections, leaves a lot to their discretion. The involvement of union-level officials in scheme selection actually brings village-level socioeconomic and political groups into play in the bargaining game over the selection of localized public good schemes. Therefore, estimating the degree of nonelite bias in localized public good scheme targeting can provide a neat measure of the effectiveness with which the long route of pro-poor accountability works at the union level.

Estimating the degree of the targeting bias in the selection of localized public good schemes gives useful insights into how well citizen-based accountability works in the local government context. This is because direct citizen contact with local government officials only happens at the union level. Therefore, assessing how well the targeting of a localized public good is working gives important insights into how accountable union councils are to the nonelite citizenry. Furthermore, heightened accountability at the union council-level is a necessary condition for heightened pro-poor accountability at the higher tiers of local government because of the indirect nature of the local government electoral system.

#### **5.4.2 Methodology and Data**

These reasons are good grounds for estimating the pro-elite targeting bias in the selection of localized public goods at the union level. The study uses census data from the villages of

Chakwal, Muzaffargarh, and Toba Tek Singh to estimate the targeting bias in the provision of soling and sanitation schemes to nonelite households. It was not possible to conduct this exercise for the other villages because there was no variation in the provision of these schemes within the remaining four villages. This is because either all or none of the households in these villages were provided with these schemes. Estimates of the targeting bias were, however, possible for the Chakwal, Muzaffargarh, and Toba Tek Singh villages because there is considerable variation in the provision of soling and sanitation schemes since the enactment of elected local governments in 2001. In order to increase the sample for this estimation, we have merged the data from our census villages with data from fieldwork conducted by the author (with Ms. Shandana Mohmand) in four villages in the Faisalabad district.<sup>27</sup> These villages also saw considerable variation in the provision of sanitation and soling schemes after the enactment of elected local governments in 2001.

Unfortunately, given the nature of the data, the exercise could only be conducted for villages in the Punjab province. As a result, the data is far more heavily weighted in favor of central Punjab villages. Therefore, the results of this exercise, while insightful, must be kept in perspective. Another constraint of the data is that, for the Faisalabad district villages, the authors did not estimate poverty rankings of households (Cheema and Mohmand 2005, footnote 5). Therefore, in order to estimate the elite bias in provision targeting, this study uses three variables to capture the elite status of a household: (i) land ownership, (ii) membership of a dominant kinship group, and (iii) literacy. Gazdar (2007) shows that these three variables are extremely important correlates of poverty (footnote 6). Therefore, a significant estimate of bias on these measures provides important insights into the anti-poor nature of targeting in scheme selection at the union council level.

<sup>27</sup> For details of data and methodology, see Section 4 of this paper, and Cheema and Mohmand (2005) (footnote 5).

There are three further empirical reasons why analysis of targeting bias in the provision of localized public goods provides useful insights into the strength of pro-poor accountability in the newly devolved system at the union council level. First, in all the Punjab villages, soling and sanitation was communicated as an essential need by key respondents during the qualitative part of the fieldwork. Second, nearly all functional sanitation and soling was provided through government schemes. Third, the qualitative fieldwork revealed that the union nazim and naib nazims of these villages were pivotal players in the selection of these schemes, and in all these villages, funds were allocated for the provision of these schemes. That is, in the parlance of the World Bank (2004) framework, delegation and financial control exists in the case of this provision (footnote 7), and therefore analyzing the targeting bias provides clean insights into which citizen group's voice counts more.

The main questions addressed by this section is (i) whether empowering the union council has reduced the elite bias in service provision, which is suggested to be a hallmark of the pre-devolution governance structure,<sup>28</sup> and (ii) whether this has reduced inequitable provision between households belonging to marginalized and elite groups. Our main empirical question is whether being (i) a landowner, (ii) a member of a dominant kinship group, or (iii) relatively literate gives a household a higher likelihood of receiving new provision of post-local government reforms.

The direction of targeting bias is estimated by comparing the change in pre- and post-devolution provision of schemes to nonelite groups with the change in pre- and post-devolution provision in favor of elite groups. The regression, which is discussed in detail in Table A.4, columns 1–2 (Appendix), calculates the difference in these changes holding pre-devolution provision to elite and nonelite groups as constant. In simple terms,

this exercise allows us to estimate the targeting bias by comparing the change in number of schemes received by nonelite groups in a village to that received by elite groups, while holding the initial provision differences between these groups constant. The study attempts to measure whether, as a result of the reforms, nonelite households are able to catch up with elite households in scheme allocation. It is possible to calculate measures of change because both the field surveys, i.e., the Faisalabad survey and the census conducted as part of TA-4319, not only capture data on the provision of a scheme but also the date on which the scheme was provided.

This data not only provides a picture of current provision, it also allows us to build a baseline of pre-devolution provision. An important contribution of this methodology is that the outcome variable, drain and soling provision before and after 2001, allows us to measure the impact of reforms on the equity of public service provision across social groups. By estimating the post-reform change in targeting biases towards different socioeconomic groups, we can get a good handle on how well the long route of “accountability” works for the poor at the union council level.

Table A.4 (columns 1–2, Appendix) suggest that there has been an 8% increase in the provision of these schemes since the local governments were enacted.<sup>29</sup> The coefficients of the village dummies reveal that these were underprovided villages pre-reforms, which suggests that the union council reforms has some impact in terms of increasing the magnitudes of provision to previously underprovided villages. However, these coefficients also reveal that not all villages have benefited equally from the increase in provision. However, columns 1–2 also show that the increase in provision is heavily biased towards members of the dominant kinship group and households with higher levels of literacy.<sup>30</sup> In a sense, this is an unsurprising result given the find-

<sup>28</sup> See Easterly (2003) and Gazdar (2002) (footnote 2).

<sup>29</sup> Estimated from the coefficient of the variable POST.

<sup>30</sup> Estimated from the coefficients of (POST\*DOM) and (POST\*LITERACY). Household literacy is measured as the proportion of literate adults in a household.

ings in the last three sections. This result confirms that the long route of accountability does not work well for the poor and for marginalized citizens at least in the Punjab villages.

Table A.5 (columns 1–2, Appendix) tests whether having a politician resident<sup>31</sup> in the village matters in obtaining a higher share in the allocation of schemes. The results show that it is associated with a significant increase in post-2001 provision.<sup>32</sup> This indicates that spatial biases may also exist in post-reform provision. Again, this result is unsurprising given the ad hoc and informal nature of the contact between village citizen groups and union-level politicians with regard to planning. The ad hoc nature of the contact weakens the long route of accountability and makes it easier for union-level politicians to target provision to their own villages and constituencies. Furthermore, it appears that, at least, in the central Punjab case, literacy acts as an asset and being part of a dominant kinship group gives considerable advantage in local-level politics. Again, it appears that belonging to a group that has a history of dominance gives its members considerable leverage in the political sphere.

This analysis provides some preliminary evidence that the weaknesses in the electoral, planning, and budgetary spheres result in the anti-poor targeting of local public goods. In a sense, this result is unsurprising given that the poor are on average less likely to vote and that the informal and ad hoc manner in which the budgetary and planning process is structured results in the poor having far lesser access to local politicians for the purpose of conveying their development needs.

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<sup>31</sup> The resident politician could be a union-level or higher-tier politician.

<sup>32</sup> Estimated from the coefficient (POST\*NAZIM).

## 6 Analyzing the Short Route of Accountability in Pakistan

The Local Government Ordinance 2001 and the wider devolution reforms have instituted a number of citizen-centered bodies to oversee public service delivery and catalyze direct citizen participation in the delivery of public goods and services. CCBs are envisaged as spontaneous and voluntary associations of citizens that can directly aggregate and express citizen needs and allow citizens to participate in the delivery of public goods and services (Qadir 2005 [footnote 15], pg. 9).

Similarly, SCs empower citizens as “stakeholders” by giving them the authority to monitor and supervise local service providers. These new bodies are expected to strengthen the short route of accountability for the poor, women, and marginalized groups. Accountability is expected to increase because these bodies involve local governments and citizens in a symbiotic relationship that places the onus of managing and monitoring the delivery of public services on both parties (Qadir 2005 [footnote 15], pg. 9). Given the importance of these bodies in the new governance framework, it is important to assess the degree to which they strengthen the short route of accountability.

Measuring the impact of these bodies on

the short route accountability is difficult at present because issues of delegation, financial control, and regulation have curtailed their true empowerment and this has affected their functioning during the first cycle of devolution.<sup>33</sup> This study uses an indirect method to assess the potential of these bodies as a means to act as organizations that strengthen the short route of pro-poor accountability. We simply ask whether citizens belonging to poor and illiterate households and nondominant kinship groups are “aware” of the existence of CCBs and SCs. Our interest is in estimating whether these socially excluded groups are less likely to be aware of these bodies compared to nonmarginalized and nonpoor households. A finding that suggests that this is the case reveals a systemic bias in “information flows” between poor and nonpoor households, which could emanate from the socioeconomic structure and/or the manner in which the selection and start-up mechanisms of these bodies have been designed.

We also ask whether poor citizens have an equal chance of participating in these bodies relative to nonpoor groups. In addition, it is also important to ask whether poor citizens’ awareness of and participation in these bodies varies with (i) the type of village-level social structure, (ii) the degree of inequality in asset-holding among groups, and (iii) the degree of socioeconomic exclusion at the village level.

**Table 13: Awareness of Citizen Community Boards (%)**

Village (in District)	No	Yes	Total
Chakwal	97.35	2.65	100.00
Dir	89.33	10.67	100.00
Mardan	100.00	0.00	100.00
Muzaffargarh	98.30	1.70	100.00
Sanghar	99.63	0.37	100.00
Thatta	99.29	0.71	100.00
Toba Tek Singh	96.70	3.30	100.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>97.69</b>	<b>2.31</b>	<b>100.00</b>

Source: Author’s fieldwork.

33 See Qadir (2005) for a useful summary (footnote 16).

**Table 14: Participation in Citizen Community Boards (%)**

Village (in District)	No	Yes	Total
Chakwal	100.00	0.00	100.00
Dir	100.00	0.00	100.00
Mardan	100.00	0.00	100.00
Muzaffargarh	99.63	0.37	100.00
Sanghar	100.00	0.00	100.00
Thatta	100.00	0.00	100.00
Toba Tek Singh	99.43	0.57	100.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>100.00</b>

Source: Author's fieldwork.

### 6.1 Awareness of and Participation in CCBs

Tables 13 and 14 show that both the level of awareness and level of participation in CCBs is extremely low. This is a consistent finding across villages. This data is in line with the popular view that citizen awareness of and participation in CCBs is extremely low.

Multivariate regression results (Appendix, Table A.6, columns 1–3) suggest that being poor is not associated with a heightened lack of awareness of CCBs.<sup>34</sup> In a sense, this is expected given the low levels of overall awareness of CCBs. However, the results also suggest that the propor-

tion of literate adults in a household is a significant positive correlate of CCB awareness. The coefficient remains significant after we have controlled for village fixed effects and for other control variables. This implies that literacy as an asset matters for catalyzing citizen awareness of CCBs. It also suggests that even after the first cycle of local governments, CCB awareness among illiterate households was nonexistent and that an important body of citizen participation had failed to function in an inclusive mechanism that engaged marginalized households.

**Table 15: Awareness of School Councils (%)**

Village (in District)	No	Yes	Total
Chakwal	81.06	18.94	100.00
Dir	67.63	32.37	100.00
Mardan	96.74	3.26	100.00
Muzaffargarh	98.24	1.76	100.00
Sanghar	96.90	3.10	100.00
Thatta	94.65	5.35	100.00
Toba Tek Singh	85.52	14.48	100.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>90.83</b>	<b>9.17</b>	<b>100.00</b>

Source: Author's fieldwork.

<sup>34</sup> The coefficient on poor becomes insignificant once we put in the controls.

## 6.2 Awareness of SCs

While the level of citizen awareness of SCs is higher than the level of awareness of CCBs (Table 15), the overall level of citizen awareness of the former is also poor in absolute terms. A majority of respondents reported lack of awareness of SCs. This is an interesting result given that SCs were operational in nearly all the census villages, yet Dir was the only village where a significant number of people were aware of SCs.

Multivariate regression results (Appendix, Table A.6, columns 4–7), however, report considerable inequity in awareness of SCs among citizen cohorts. Poor households are significantly less likely to have heard of SCs even after controlling for village effects. As opposed to this, being a member of the dominant kinship group has a significant positive association with SC awareness. Regression results<sup>35</sup> also suggest that being a parent does not imply a higher degree of awareness of SCs. This suggests that information regarding the existence of SCs is not widespread at the village level and that poor households and citizens from nondominant kinship groups are excluded from the flow of this information. Part of the reason for this is that there is a strong, significant, and positive association between household-level male literacy and SC awareness. It is more than likely that poor households and households from nondominant kinship groups are also more likely to be illiterate.

Interestingly, the proportion of literate adult women in a household is insignificantly associated with awareness of SCs. This is an interesting result because one would expect SCs in girls' schools to attempt to involve educated women from the village. The upshot is that SCs have not emerged as institutions that are inclusive of the poor and marginalized. This points to the need for designing selection mechanisms and consultation mechanisms at the SC level that actively engage citizens who are poor and belong to nondominant marginalized social groups and illiterate

households.

## 6.3 The Political Accountability Index

To address the question of whether poor citizens are able to hold governments accountable along multiple dimensions, we construct a political accountability index, which, in turn, involves constructing two separate indices. The first index, "political accountability 1," is constructed by taking an adjusted sum of scores of six separate survey items: (i) meetings with nazim, (ii) meetings with councilors, (iii) proportion of females who possess a national identity card, (iv) proportion of males who possess a national identity card, (v) proportion of females who voted, and (vi) proportion of males who voted. An individual household's score on this index reflects the effect of diverse modes through which citizens can hold governments accountable through the long route. The principal-component-analysis method was used to initially compute group scores for the six initial classes of variable identified above. Once these scores had been computed, the principal-component-analysis was used to compute a composite accountability score across the six groups. The higher this score, the greater an individual household's overall ability to hold the government accountable through the long route.

We use this index to address the basic question this study asks, i.e., are the poor, women, and socially excluded citizens as able to hold governments accountable as nonpoor, male, and elite groups? Table A.7, column 1 (Appendix) shows that poverty is negatively and significantly related to political accountability through the long route. Furthermore, the orders of magnitude appear to be quite large. Column 3 of the table shows that this relationship holds even after controlling for village fixed effects and other variables of interest. In addition, we find that (i) being from the dominant kinship group and (ii) male and female literacy have a highly significant positive correlation with political accountability. This is in line with our earlier findings that dominant

<sup>35</sup> Not reported in the Appendix but available from the author on request.

and literate groups are better able to hold governments accountable through the long route while poor households are unable to effectively hold governments accountable.

We also calculate a second index of political accountability, “political accountability 2,” which takes into account awareness of CCBs and SCs along with the above six variables. The results using this index are the same as the results obtained from using the first index. The results suggest the existence of a strong anti-poor, anti-illiterate, and anti-illiterate women accountability bias in Pakistan’s current governance structure.

## 7 Conclusion

### 7.1 Long Route of Accountability

#### 7.1.1 Electoral Sphere

The main focus of this study was to examine how well the long route of accountability works in Pakistan. The results show that electoral participation in Pakistan is low and segmented along lines of gender, poverty, literacy, and caste hierarchy. The study shows that current levels of female electoral participation are low and, given these levels, it is unlikely that governments will be responsive to the needs of women. We also find that patterns of voting across villages are correlated with patterns of patriarchy documented in Mohmand and Gazdar (2007) (footnote 20).

One interesting finding is that, controlling for other factors, poor male and female voters tend to vote far less than nonpoor male and female voters. It appears that the electoral sphere is suitably truncated by a household's poverty status. This is in stark contrast with the case of India, where findings show that the "poor in India tend to vote more than the middle class or the rich, villages more than cities, and lower castes more than upper castes" (Keefer and Khemani 2004, and Yadav 2000).<sup>36</sup> This raises the important question as to why political elites are unable/reluctant to mobilize the votes of the poor, which constitute a significant demographic population. Some preliminary explanations for this paradox are given below in Section 7.3 explaining the persistence of structural constraints.

The study also finds that literacy is an important positive correlate of voting turnouts both among male and female voters. However, the evidence from Gazdar (2007) (footnote 6) and Mohmand and Gazdar (2007) (footnote 20) suggests that literacy is endogenous to poverty.<sup>37</sup> This suggests that poverty and literacy appear to have

a self-reinforcing cycle, which suggests that the constraints to voting are much more structural than appears at first glance. This interpretation is strengthened when we recognize that female and male members of a dominant kinship group have much higher voting turnouts compared to others in their village. The dominant kinship group result is interesting because, as pointed out by Gazdar (2007), the variable used to capture dominant kinship groups is the group that was historically recognized as the dominant group (footnote 6). This variable makes no assumption about the current socioeconomic status of the kinship group. The fact that historical groups continue to dominate the electoral sphere irrespective of their current status points to the persistence of structural constraints. Again, this raises more questions than it answers. An attempted explanation for the persistence of structural constraints is given below.

#### 7.1.2 Planning and Budgeting Spheres

The study shows that, under the current reform, an "institutional gap" remains in that individual mauzas/dehs and pinds/goths, as well as citizens do not participate directly in budgeting, development planning, and the selection of schemes. The enactment of VNCs was supposed to bridge this "institutional gap;" however, these bodies have not been made operational even though the recently promulgated local governments have entered their second electoral cycle. The "institutional gap" means that the process through which citizens convey their development needs to their union nazim, naib nazim, and councilors remains "informal" and "ad hoc" and is not binding on the agents of the state.

Furthermore, citizens can only voice their "levels of satisfaction" concerning local government budgets, plans, and schemes ex post at the time of election of their local representatives. No formal space for citizen-state engagement on

<sup>36</sup> See: Keefer, P., and S. Khemani. 2004. Why Do the Poor Receive Poor Services? *Economic and Political Weekly*, 28 February; and Yadav, Y. 2000. Understanding the Second Democratic Upsurge. In *Transforming India: Social and Political Dynamics of Democracy*. Edited by F. Frankel. India: Oxford University Press.

<sup>37</sup> We would like to thank Dr. Aliya Khan and Mr. Richard Martini for pointing this out to us.



planning and budgeting is available in the current institutional framework. This is in contrast to experiments with direct citizen participation in West Bengal and Kerala in India and Porte Algre in Brazil, where citizens play a direct role in budget formulation and oversight. Citizens can exercise some decision-making control over the CCB component of the budget, but there is no enforceable requirement that the formulation of CCBs must involve or represent the wider village-level citizenry.

Another key finding of the study is that citizens' access to "informal" and "ad hoc" meetings at which they can convey their development needs to union nazims, naib nazims, and councilors, is not symmetric between different citizen types. The study shows that a small minority of respondents report attending these informal meetings. More importantly, there is a systemic anti-poor bias in respondents reporting informal contact. Furthermore, the study also shows that the proportion of literate adults in a household is a statistically strong correlate of attendance to these informal meetings. This suggests that the voice of illiterate and poor households is systemically less likely to be counted in the assessment of needs in the planning process.

### 7.1.3 Anti-Poor Targeting Bias in Service Delivery

The study documents considerable biases since the local government reforms in the targeting of local public goods (such as sanitation and soling) in central Punjab<sup>38</sup> between households within the same village. For these villages, the study shows that, while there has been a significant increase in provision, this increase has been biased in favor of dominant kinship group households with higher levels of literacy. The study also finds that having a politician resident in the village matters for obtaining a higher share in the allocation of schemes, which suggests that spatial biases may also exist in post-reform provision. An important caveat that needs to be kept in mind

when interpreting these results is that this analysis was conducted for a small number of villages in Punjab, albeit the household sample was very large.

These results are unsurprising given the ad hoc and informal nature of the contact between village citizen groups and union-level politicians on issues of planning as well as the manner in which the electoral sphere is structured. The results show that these weaknesses in the long route of accountability make it easier for union-level politicians to target provision to their own villages and constituencies. What is important is that weaknesses in the long route of accountability have real outcome effects in the sample villages. Furthermore, it appears that, at least in the central Punjab case, literacy and being part of a dominant kinship group gives considerable advantage in local-level politics.

### 7.2 Awareness of Citizen-Based Service Delivery and Oversight Bodies

With regard to the short route of accountability, the study asks a much more limited set of questions: (i) to what degree are the poor, women, and marginalized and socially excluded citizens "aware" of the newly constituted citizen-based service delivery and oversight bodies; and (ii) how does the level of awareness in these citizen types compare with other citizen types. The study asks these limited questions because citizen-based service delivery and oversight bodies such as CCBs and SCs are in the process of being institutionalized and at this point it is difficult to conduct an impact assessment of them. However, our contention is that this more restricted set of questions gives important insights into the process of institutionalization of these citizen-based bodies and the extent to which the poor, women, and marginalized and socially excluded citizens are involved in the process. As pointed out earlier, this is an important set of questions to ask because local governments had completed their first elec-

<sup>38</sup> A similar analysis could not be done for other provinces because of the low variation in our outcome variable. This is because villages were either universally provided local public goods pre-reforms, or universally not provided any local public goods post-reforms.

toral cycle at the time of this study and answers from this set of questions will give us an insight into the likelihood of the poor, women, and illiterate households accessing these citizen-based bodies within the current system.

The study shows that the level of awareness of CCBs and SCs is extremely low, and that there are systemic biases in lack of awareness between different citizen groups. In the case of CCBs, we find that literacy is the most significant correlate of CCB awareness. In the case of SCs, poor and illiterate households and women are on average less likely to be aware that such bodies exist. As opposed to this, we find that being a member of the dominant kinship group of the village has a significant positive association with awareness of SCs. This, again, suggests that structural constraints might impair the access that the poor, women, and illiterate citizens have to citizen-based bodies unless measures are taken to make access to these bodies more representative and participatory.

### 7.3 Persisting Structural Constraints to Accountability

#### 7.3.1 Degrees of Socioeconomic Inequality

Village case studies and empirical analysis point towards the persistence of structural constraints that continue to inhibit the long route of accountability in Pakistan's governance system.<sup>39</sup> In what follows, we measure the strength of the long route of accountability by the degree to which citizens can exercise independent choice over their decision to vote. Analysis reveals three salient relationships between socioeconomic and political conditions and accountability:

- (i) Where socioeconomic inequality is low and electoral politics competitive, we find the prevalence of independent voting, which we would expect to strengthen the long route of accountability for the poor.
- (ii) High levels of socioeconomic inequality when

combined with personality-based politics results in dependent village-level patron-client voting, which appears to weaken accountability.

- (iii) However, low levels of socioeconomic inequality are not sufficient to ensure independent voting if it is combined with monopoly higher-tier factions and personality-based politics.

We also find that the low propensity to vote among women is integrally linked to their restricted patterns of physical and social mobility. This, in turn, appears to be related to patterns of endogamy that exist to preserve and perpetuate kinship groups (Mohmand and Gazdar 2007, footnote 20).

This suggests that there is considerable variation at the local level between levels of socioeconomic inequality across villages from different districts. It appears that the socioeconomic structure in some villages, such as our Muzaffargarh and Dir villages, has evolved in the direction of greater socioeconomic equality, whereas in villages from other districts we find that high levels of socioeconomic inequality continue to persist, suggesting the persistence of structural constraints. In particular, dependent voting appears to be related to (i) the degree of landlessness, (ii) the difference in poverty headcounts between socially excluded and dominant castes, and (iii) dependence on others' land as a servant.

Evidence of nondependent voting is found in the cases of Dir and Muzaffargarh. These cases give interesting insights into the type of conditions that are needed to break the dependent voting cycle. The three most salient features of these villages that put them apart from the rest are: (i) low levels of social equality as measured by the difference in poverty headcounts between socially excluded and dominant kinship groups, (ii) active political party activity, and (iii) strong political competition. The political conditions

<sup>39</sup> This section draws heavily on Section 5.2 of this paper.

prevailing in these villages are a result of the structural features discussed below (Section 7.3.2) as well as the history of local-level political activism. Low levels of social equality are partly the result of low levels of inequality in land ownership. However, an important difference between these villages and others is the access its socially excluded and nondominant castes have to nonfarm activities (Table 16).

Table 16 shows that the main source of nonfarm employment in Dir is the international labor market and government employment. In Muzaffargarh, the main source of nonfarm employment is the domestic labor market. Furthermore, in both Dir and Muzaffargarh, nonfarm labor market opportunities are available to nondominant kinship groups and these opportunities tend to play an equalizing role in the extent of poverty between elite and nonelite groups. In the Muzaffargarh village, this is done by redistributing poverty but, in both cases holding political

conditions constant, access to nonfarm labor market opportunities reduces the extent of dependent voting, which is likely to lead to strengthened pro-poor accountability. This suggests that dependent voting is more likely to occur in agrarian transitions that decrease the relative access to land for nondominant kinship groups without a commensurate compensation of income through nonfarm activities

This analysis suggests that strengthening accountability would require either:

- ♦ increasing nondominant kinship groups' access to land assets,
- ♦ diversifying economic opportunities for nondominant kinship groups by opening up the possibility of entering nonfarm activities, or
- ♦ ensuring a reduction in the poverty differential between dominant and nondominant kinship groups.

**Table 16: Male Workers by Sector and Activity (Primary Occupation)**  
(%)

Sector/Activity	Chakwal	Dir	Mardan	Muzaffargarh	Sanghar	Toba Tek Singh	Thatta	Total
Economically active proportion of reference age group	88.5	74.3	77.1	83.6	90.9	78.6	86.7	83.3
Self-cultivator	45.9	23.5	11.9	25.1	22.3	22.8	1.6	19.7
Tenant cultivator	2.7	0.4	20.9	6.9	45.6	4.2	2.0	15.2
Livestock owner	2.1	2.2	6.3	0.9	6.6	2.2	2.8	3.5
Casual labor	15.1	15	22.1	30.9	8.7	17.1	55.4	23.9
Skilled worker/mechanic	1.4	0.4	0.0	3.5	0.1	2.4	16.3	4.0
Farm servant	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	1.7	8.2	0.0	2.4
Nonfarm servant	0.0	0.9	0.4	1.4	0.7	0.9	2.2	1.1
Government job	18.5	14.6	5.1	0.7	3.1	12	1.8	6.4
Shop	2.1	4.0	2.0	4.4	2.4	5.2	11.3	4.9
Transport	0.7	0.0	7.5	0.9	2.0	2.1	0.2	1.8
Factory worker	0.0	0.9	2.0	4.8	0.6	13.5	0.2	4.2
Labor abroad	0.0	31.4	10.7	0.2	0.0	1.9	0.0	3.8
Labor in big city	0.7	2.7	8.3	4.4	0.3	2.5	0.6	2.4
Other	11.0	3.5	2.8	15.4	5.7	4.9	5.8	6.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: Author's fieldwork

### 7.3.2 Degree of Political Competition

We also find that low levels of socioeconomic inequality reduce dependent voting in only those areas where politics has evolved to become competitive. In areas where politics is personalized and dominated by oligarchies and monopolies, we find the persistence of dependent voting irrespective of the level of socioeconomic inequality. In addition, we find that, in these areas, poor households are far less likely to vote because of political party affiliation and far more likely to vote because of the pressure of a village influential. Again, it appears that structural constraints in the political sphere prevent the poor from exercising their choice to act as independent voters. These structural constraints include the absence of well-organized political parties that can mobilize the poor and reduce their dependence on the village influential in the electoral sphere. Strengthening the long route of accountability would require strengthening the presence of political collectivities capable of mobilizing the poor in the electoral sphere.

Elections on a nonparty basis appear to strengthen personality-based politics and reinforce precisely the type of politics that strengthens dependent voting. Instead of limiting electoral competition, the governance structure should encourage competition by enabling the entry of organized political parties at the local level that have the incentive to mobilize poor voters and can affect this mobilization by reducing the transaction and financial costs of electoral mobilization among poor voters. In the absence of these collectivities, the poor appear to be faced with considerable financial and transaction costs that reduce their incentive to exercise their choice as independent voters. However, there should be pressure on political parties to democratize and establish grassroots representation, internal accountability, and electoral mechanisms to increase the

leverage of the poor vis-à-vis dominant group politicians.

### 7.4 Constraints on Voter Turnouts among the Poor

An important finding of this study is that poor voters tend to vote less, controlling for other factors, and are more likely to vote as dependent voters. This is an important finding and needs explanation.<sup>40</sup> In the Pakistani context, the standard explanation is that it reflects voters' lack of faith in the democratic process because of the country's weak democratic tradition. However, this does not account for why the poor have systematically low voting turnouts since lack of faith in the democratic process should affect the poor and nonpoor equally. The standard explanation for this finding in other contexts is that poverty increases the opportunity cost of investing time and resources in the electoral sphere (Krishna 2003 and Young 2000).<sup>41</sup>

This still begs the question why politicians do not have the necessary incentive to organize this potentially large vote bank. One explanation for this is that politicians find it difficult to make credible promises to poor voters on the provision of broadly targeted public goods or redistributive private transfers.<sup>42</sup> As a result, the policy platforms of different politicians become irrelevant to elections. The lack of credibility of promises implies that the poor will participate less actively in the electoral sphere because they expect lower outputs from their representatives. In addition, evidence from India seems to suggest that politicians' promises are credible to a narrow segment of client voters with whom they have long-term personal relationships, while other voters, especially the poor, tend to be discounted in the electoral game (Keefer and Khemani 2004,

<sup>40</sup> We would like to thank Dr. G. M. Arif for raising this question.

<sup>41</sup> See: Krishna, A. K. 2003. Poor People's Participation in Democracy at the Local Level. Working Paper Series SAN03-04, Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy, Duke University, North Carolina, p. 3; and Young, I. M. 2000. *Inclusion and Democracy*. USA: Oxford University Press.

<sup>42</sup> This argument draws on Keefer and Khemani (2004) who focus on public goods provision (footnote 36). The reasoning holds equally well for redistributive private transfers such as land reforms, homestead land schemes, or the efficient and equitable functioning of social safety nets.

footnote 36). This provides an explanation for our finding that, in the survey villages, local public goods tended to target dominant kinship group households and not the landless and socially excluded.

In addition, lack of coordination among voters makes it even more difficult for politicians to credibly commit to certain promises to a broad segment of the electorate and for excluded voters to effectively threaten politicians with electoral defeat. We have seen that, in Pakistan, high degrees of socioeconomic inequality and the absence of sufficient political competition make it extremely difficult for the poor to enter the electoral sphere as independent voters. This blunts the credible electoral threat they exercise and mutes the credibility of politicians' promises to provide broadly targeted public goods. This lack of credibility reinforces their incentive to target those clients with whom they have personal linkages, because their promises are credible to this narrow segment.

Finally, the particular system of local electoral representation in Pakistan does not create strong incentives for politicians at the district or tehsil/taluka levels to directly invest in voter mobilization. These higher-level politicians—who might enjoy economies of scale in political investment due to the size of their constituencies—are elected indirectly by an electoral college. Their prime focus, therefore, is likely to be the union council level-politician and not the individual voter. This indirect form of representation tends to weaken the political-economic rationale for organized and stable political parties, because it undervalues the potential for economies of scale in political transactions. One of the functions of political parties—and a clear advantage that they enjoy over individual dominant group politicians—is to internalize the economies of scale.

Our analysis suggests that political clientelism in Pakistan appears to have been strengthened by (i) the absence of effective political party competition with well-defined voter bases and campaign platforms, (ii) by asymmetric relations

of socioeconomic dependence among poor and nonpoor citizens, and (iii) by the persistence of considerable socioeconomic inequality between different social groups. A switch from indirect to direct elections for higher levels of local government (tehsil and district) is likely to increase the incentive for politicians to invest in the mobilization of poor voters. This might be a possible direction of reform if the pro-poor potential of local democracy is to be realized more fully. The participation of poor voters is likely to increase if politicians are able to make more credible promises with respect to public goods provision or redistributive private transfers. Some issues of credibility are likely to be addressed over time as the system becomes more institutionalized and initial confusion about the division of powers and responsibilities is resolved.

### **7.5 Is Literacy a Panacea?**

This study has emphasized that, in addition to socioeconomic equality and political competition, literacy is a strong positive correlate of (i) electoral accountability, (ii) access to the planning mechanism and public services, and (iii) awareness of the newly constituted citizen-based service delivery and oversight bodies. However, a careful analysis reveals that literacy is not a panacea for weak accountability. Gazdar (2007) shows that literacy outcomes are much worse among the poor, precisely the group of voters that are dependent and less active (footnote 6). This suggests that literacy itself is a differentiated asset and that high levels of inequality in literacy outcomes represent an equilibrium that is endogenous to poor governance and to socioeconomic inequality. It is, therefore, unlikely that literacy will be the variable that strengthens the ability of the poor to hold governments accountable. The equilibrium represents a vicious cycle where poor citizens who need to acquire education as an asset with which to enhance their ability to compete in the electoral sphere are least able to exercise "voice" in the electoral sphere, precisely because they lack access to education and literacy. Furthermore, the local governments that need to educate the poor most are likely to be the very

governments least responsive to the poor because of their lack of educational assets. This suggests that removing the structural constraints mentioned above may be a necessary condition for altering the low accountability equilibrium.

However, additional measures that increase access to literacy and education for poor people are likely to have positive governance effects. It needs to be reiterated that, in a political economy framework, it is unclear whether governments that are irresponsive to poor and illiterate citizens will have the incentive to provide them with education and literacy, especially in the absence of changes that reduce socioeconomic inequality and increase political competition at the local level. If the situation can indeed be characterized as a “low-level equilibrium” in which social, economic, and political structures reinforce one another, it is important to think of mutually reinforcing reforms in the political, social, and economic spheres. Our findings suggest that electoral changes in the absence of other pro-active reforms may not be leading drivers of pro-poor change. The analysis reported here reveals that historically dominant groups have tended to retain their influence in the political sphere even after having lost their economic pre-eminence in a number of cases.

### 7.6 Persisting Institutional and Information Gaps<sup>43</sup>

The study finds that the ad hoc and informal nature of budgetary needs assessment and planning results in avenues of elite capture at the union level. This is because of an “institutional gap” in the budgetary and planning processes that do not allow for any direct participation by villages and village citizens. VNCs, that were to provide direct participation, remain dormant, and the only mechanisms available to citizens for voicing their satisfaction with budgetary choices is either informal contact or at the time of elections. We have already argued that, with weaknesses in the long route of accountability, elections are going

to provide a blunt instrument with which the poor, women, and socially excluded can hold electoral representatives accountable.

Institutionalizing budgetary mechanisms that allow for citizen participation is an important precondition to give the poor, women, and socially excluded citizens a voice in budgetary choices. For these measures to strengthen pro-poor accountability, they must be accompanied by other measures that strengthen electoral competition and reduce the difference in access to key assets between poor and nonpoor citizens. There is, nonetheless, a possibility of “elite capture” in participatory budgetary mechanisms in areas that are plagued by high levels of socioeconomic inequality and the absence of political competition. In these areas, it is extremely important to strengthen planning systems in tehsil and district governments and to institute performance-based grants for union councils, which are tied to equity indicators that aim to give union councils incentive to make pro-poor allocations. These performance-based grants will require the institutionalization of a mapping exercise that, using GIS technology, can document the availability of facilities at the village and union council level.

The mapping exercise will provide the necessary information on differences in access to facilities within and between villages. Union-level report cards can be generated and reported at the level of union, village, and lane. In addition, disaggregated budgetary information must be provided at the union, village, and lane level. This mapping information could provide the foundation for making performance-based grants operational for union councils. In addition, this information could be made public at district, tehsil, and union council meetings and through local nongovernment organizations at village-level meetings. The aim of this information would be to make citizens aware of how poor services are and which services are doing worse than others, but also how poor services are in their union, village, and lane relative to others. An added benefit of this interven-

<sup>43</sup> This section draws on Keefer and Khemani (2004) (footnote 36).

tion would be that it would allow voters to benchmark the performance of their union-level representatives relative to others both in terms of acquiring budgets from higher tiers of local government and in establishing equity of distribution within union councils.

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## APPENDIX: BACKGROUND DATA

**Table A.1: Multivariate Regressions for Dependent Variable**

Variable	Voted			Females		
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Intercept	0.577 <sup>a</sup> (0.008)	0.794 <sup>a</sup> (0.027)	0.578 <sup>a</sup> (0.012)	0.331 <sup>a</sup> (0.011)	0.561 <sup>a</sup> (0.030)	0.494 <sup>a</sup> (0.045)
Poor				-0.083 <sup>a</sup> (0.018)	-0.040 <sup>b</sup> (0.018)	-0.036 <sup>c</sup> (0.021)
Female	-0.265 <sup>a</sup> (0.012)	-0.265 <sup>a</sup> (0.012)	-0.302 <sup>a</sup> (0.016)			
Literacy			-0.001 (0.016)			
Dir		-0.427 <sup>a</sup> (0.032)			-0.505 <sup>a</sup> (0.045)	-0.429 <sup>a</sup> (0.046)
Mardan		-0.249 <sup>a</sup> (0.032)			-0.384 <sup>a</sup> (0.042)	-0.249 <sup>a</sup> (0.043)
Muzaffargarh		-0.190 <sup>a</sup> (0.030)			-0.232 <sup>a</sup> (0.036)	-0.133 <sup>a</sup> (0.038)
Sanghar		-0.257 <sup>a</sup> (0.029)			-0.260 <sup>a</sup> (0.034)	-0.156 <sup>a</sup> (0.038)
Thatta		-0.277 <sup>a</sup> (0.030)			-0.439 <sup>a</sup> (0.040)	-0.333 <sup>a</sup> (0.049)
Toba Tek Singh		-0.113 <sup>a</sup> (0.012)			-0.014 <sup>a</sup> (0.034)	-0.071 <sup>b</sup> (0.035)
Literacy (Female) <sup>c</sup>			0.091 <sup>a</sup> (0.024)			0.099 <sup>a</sup> (0.030)
Dom						0.0498 <sup>c</sup> (0.019)
R-Squared	0.006	0.090	0.103	0.020	0.200	0.256
Observations	1,656	1,650	1,648	1,186	1,186	839
Village Dummies	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Notes: Dependent variables: (i) "voted" = adults who voted in 2005 union council elections, (ii) "females" = proportion of females in household who voted. Independent variables: (i) "poor" = household below the poverty line, (ii) "literacy" = proportion of literate adults in household, (iii) "dom" = member of dominant kinship group, (iv) controls include: occupation, tenancy, migration status of household, landownership, headcount, and female landownership.

<sup>a</sup> 1% level of significance.

<sup>b</sup> 5% level of significance.

<sup>c</sup> 10% level of significance.

Source: Author's fieldwork.

**Table A.2: Multivariate Regressions for Dependent Variable**

Variable	Males	Males	Males	Identity Card	Identity Card	Identity Card
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Intercept	0.420 <sup>a</sup> (0.010)	0.515 <sup>a</sup> (0.032)	0.567 <sup>a</sup> (0.044)	0.530 <sup>a</sup> (0.010)	0.630 <sup>a</sup> (0.032)	0.592 <sup>a</sup> (0.048)
Poor	-0.007 (0.015)	-0.043 <sup>b</sup> (0.017)	-0.062 <sup>a</sup> (0.019)	-0.056 <sup>a</sup> (0.014)	-0.043 <sup>a</sup> (0.016)	-0.055 <sup>a</sup> (0.019)
Dir		-0.218 <sup>a</sup> (0.040)	-0.213 <sup>a</sup> (0.041)		-0.022 (0.039)	-0.008 (0.042)
Mardan		-0.109 <sup>a</sup> (0.042)	-0.048 (0.041)		-0.166 <sup>a</sup> (0.041)	-0.126 <sup>a</sup> (0.042)
Muzaffargarh		-0.068 <sup>c</sup> (0.037)	-0.050 (0.037)		-0.146 <sup>a</sup> (0.037)	-0.119 <sup>a</sup> (0.038)
Sanghar		-0.149 <sup>a</sup> (0.035)	-0.083 <sup>b</sup> (0.039)		-0.155 <sup>a</sup> (0.035)	-0.010 <sup>a</sup> (0.039)
Thatta		0.014 (0.038)	0.122 <sup>a</sup> (0.048)		-0.083 <sup>b</sup> (0.038)	0.019 (0.046)
Toba Tek Singh		-0.045 (0.035)	-0.044 (0.035)		-0.081 <sup>b</sup> (0.035)	-0.083 <sup>b</sup> (0.038)
Literacy (Male) <sup>c</sup>			0.139 <sup>a</sup> (0.031)			0.206 <sup>a</sup> (0.031)
Dom			0.037 <sup>b</sup> (.0184)			0.0420 <sup>b</sup> (0.019)
R-Squared	0.0001	0.057	0.057	0.009	0.040	0.172
Observations	1,479	1,479	1,585	1,583	1,583	1,058
Village Dummies	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Notes: Dependent variables: (i) "males" = proportion of males in household who voted, (ii) "identity card" = proportion of males in household with identity cards. Independent variables: (i) poor = household below the poverty line, (ii) literacy = proportion of literate adults in household, (iii) dom = member of dominant kinship group, (iv) controls include: occupation, tenancy, migration status of household, landownership, headcount, and female landownership.

<sup>a</sup> 1% level of significance.

<sup>b</sup> 5% level of significance.

<sup>c</sup> 10% level of significance.

Source: Author's fieldwork.

**Table A.3: Multivariate Regressions**

Variable	Nazim		Nazim	Councilor		Councilor
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Intercept	0.144 <sup>a</sup> (0.010)	0.373 <sup>a</sup> (0.034)	0.353 <sup>a</sup> (0.057)	0.136 <sup>a</sup> (0.01)	0.233 <sup>a</sup> (0.033)	0.175 <sup>a</sup> (0.054)
Poor	-0.067 <sup>a</sup> (0.016)	-0.076 <sup>a</sup> (0.017)	-0.053 <sup>b</sup> (0.024)	-0.068 <sup>a</sup> (0.015)	-0.080 <sup>a</sup> (0.017)	-0.058 <sup>b</sup> (0.023)
Dir		-0.223 <sup>a</sup> (0.042)	-0.314 <sup>a</sup> (0.053)		-0.043 (0.041)	-0.095 <sup>c</sup> (0.050)
Mardan		-0.244 <sup>a</sup> (0.044)	-0.342 <sup>a</sup> (0.053)		-0.128 <sup>a</sup> (0.043)	-0.180 <sup>a</sup> (0.051)
Muzaffargarh		-0.244 <sup>a</sup> (0.039)	-0.313 <sup>a</sup> (0.049)		-0.094 <sup>b</sup> (0.038)	-0.107 <sup>b</sup> (0.046)
Sanghar		-0.269 <sup>a</sup> (0.037)	-0.374 <sup>a</sup> (0.049)		-0.110 <sup>a</sup> (0.0364)	-0.202 <sup>a</sup> (0.047)
Thatta		-0.168 <sup>a</sup> (0.040)	-0.248 <sup>a</sup> (0.059)		-0.034 (0.039)	-0.055 (0.056)
Toba Tek Singh		-0.250 <sup>a</sup> (0.037)	-0.386 <sup>a</sup> (0.046)		-0.135 <sup>a</sup> (0.036)	-0.184 <sup>a</sup> (0.043)
Literacy (Male) <sup>c</sup>			0.077 <sup>b</sup> (0.038)			0.075 <sup>b</sup> (0.037)
R-Squared	0.011	0.049	0.068	0.012	0.029	0.038
Observations	1,648	1,647	1,081	1,636	1,635	1,073
Village Dummies	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

*Nazim* = mayor.

Notes: Dependent variables: (i) "nazim" = meeting with union nazim to convey development needs, (ii) "councilor" = meeting with union councilor to convey development needs. Independent variables: (i) poor = household below the poverty line, (ii) literacy = proportion of literate adults in household, (iii) controls include: occupation, tenancy, migration status of household, landownership, headcount, female landownership, and membership of dominant kinship group.

<sup>a</sup> 1% level of significance.

<sup>b</sup> 5% level of significance.

<sup>c</sup> 10% level of significance.

Source: Author's fieldwork.

**Table A.4: Multivariate Regressions**

Variable	Provision of Sanitation/Soling	
	1	2
Intercept	0.016 (0.040)	0.147 <sup>b</sup> (0.032)
Post 2001	0.077 <sup>b</sup> (0.350)	0.015 <sup>c</sup> (0.130)
Land	0.004 <sup>c</sup> (0.002)	0.005 <sup>b</sup> (0.002)
Post (Land) <sup>c</sup>	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)
Dom	0.014 (0.028)	0.044 (0.032)
Post (Dom) <sup>c</sup>	0.105 <sup>a</sup> (0.04)	0.071 <sup>c</sup> (0.035)
Literacy	0.007 (0.005)	0.010 (0.006)
Post (Literacy) <sup>c</sup>	0.306 <sup>a</sup> (0.050)	0.377 <sup>b</sup> (0.153)
Faisalabad 1	0.422 <sup>a</sup> (0.049)	
Faisalabad 2	0.124 <sup>b</sup> (0.049)	
Faisalabad 3	0.181 <sup>a</sup> (0.048)	
Faisalabad 4	0.205 <sup>a</sup> (0.049)	
Muzaffargarh	-0.035 (0.039)	
Toba Tek Singh	0.221 <sup>a</sup> (0.038)	
R-Squared	0.237	0.190
Observations	2,102	2,102
Village Dummies	Yes	No
Controls	Yes	Yes

Notes: Independent variables: (i) post 2001 = provision of sanitation/soling post-2001.

a 1% level of significance.

b 5% level of significance.

c 10% level of significance.

Source: Author's fieldwork.

**Table A.5: Multivariate Regressions**

Variable	Provision of Sanitation/Soling	
	1	2
Intercept	0.126 <sup>a</sup> (0.032)	0.03 (0.041)
Post 2001	0.014 (0.131)	0.402 (0.036)
Land	0.005 <sup>b</sup> (0.002)	0.004 <sup>b</sup> (0.002)
Post (Land) <sup>c</sup>	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)
Dom	0.044 (0.032)	0.023 (0.028)
Post (Dom) <sup>c</sup>	0.071 <sup>c</sup> (0.035)	0.083 <sup>b</sup> (0.04)
Literacy	0.010 (0.006)	0.006 (0.008)
Post (Literacy) <sup>c</sup>	0.377 <sup>b</sup> (0.153)	0.329 <sup>a</sup> (0.05)
Nazim	0.105 (0.092)	0.326 <sup>a</sup> (0.054)
Post (Nazim) <sup>c</sup>	0.198 <sup>c</sup> (0.094)	0.193 <sup>a</sup> (0.049)
Jaranwala 2		0.125 <sup>b</sup> (0.049)
Jaranwala 3		0.182 <sup>a</sup> (0.048)
Jaranwala 4		-0.218 <sup>a</sup> (0.044)
Muzaffargarh		-0.0339 (0.039)
Toba Tek Singh		0.220 <sup>a</sup> (0.038)
R-Squared	0.19	0.24
Observations	2,102	2,102
Village Dummies	No	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes

Notes: Independent variables: (i) post 2001 = provision of sanitation/soling post-2001.

a 1% level of significance.

b 5% level of significance.

c 10% level of significance.

Source: Author's fieldwork.

**Table A.6: Multivariate Regressions**

Variable	CCBs		SCs		SCs		SCs	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Intercept	0.034 <sup>a</sup> (0.005)	0.028 <sup>c</sup> (0.016)	0.007 (0.024)	0.141 <sup>a</sup> (0.009)	0.197 <sup>a</sup> (0.03)	0.082 <sup>b</sup> (0.044)	0.097 <sup>b</sup> (0.053)	
Poor	-0.026 <sup>a</sup> (0.007)	-0.016 <sup>c</sup> (0.008)	-0.165 (0.011)	-0.111 <sup>a</sup> (0.014)	-0.074 <sup>a</sup> (0.015)	-0.058 <sup>a</sup> (0.019)	-0.067 <sup>a</sup> (0.023)	
Literacy			0.035 <sup>c</sup> (0.019)			0.105 <sup>a</sup> (0.035)		
Dir		0.073 <sup>a</sup> (0.02)	0.080 <sup>a</sup> (0.024)		0.136 <sup>a</sup> (0.037)	0.119 <sup>a</sup> (0.043)	0.072 (0.05)	
Mardan		-0.023 (0.021)	-0.026 (0.024)		-0.141 <sup>a</sup> (0.038)	-0.146 <sup>a</sup> (0.044)	-0.194 <sup>a</sup> (0.051)	
Muzaffargarh		-0.002 (0.018)	0.002 (0.022)		-0.127 <sup>a</sup> (0.034)	-0.104 <sup>a</sup> (0.039)	-0.136 <sup>a</sup> (0.046)	
Sanghar		-0.016 (0.018)	-0.008 (0.021)		-0.137 <sup>a</sup> (0.033)	-0.104 <sup>a</sup> (0.039)	-0.141 <sup>a</sup> (0.046)	
Thatta		-0.011 (0.019)	-0.011 (0.025)		-0.086 <sup>b</sup> (0.035)	0.001 (0.046)	-0.017 (0.055)	
Toba Tek Singh		0.011 (0.017)	0.003 (0.02)		-0.037 (0.032)	-0.053 (0.037)	-0.092 <sup>b</sup> (0.043)	
Land							-0.0002 (0.0005)	
Literacy (Male) <sup>c</sup>							0.078 <sup>b</sup> (0.036)	
Literacy (Female) <sup>c</sup>							0.053 (0.033)	
Dom						0.065 <sup>a</sup> (0.019)	0.0762 <sup>a</sup> (0.022)	
R-Squared	0.008	0.035	0.036	0.037	0.111	0.114	0.124	
Observations	1,656	1,650	1,311	1,652	1,648	1,309	1,309	
Village Dummies	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	

CCB = community citizen board, SC = school council.

Notes: Dependent variables: (i) "CCBs" = households aware of CCBs, (ii) "SCs" = households aware of SCs. Independent variables: (i) poor = household below the poverty line, (ii) literacy = proportion of literate adults in household, (iii) dom = member of dominant kinship group, (iv) controls include: occupation, tenancy, migration status of household, landownership, headcount, and female landownership.

<sup>a</sup> 1% level of significance.

<sup>b</sup> 5% level of significance.

<sup>c</sup> 10% level of significance.

Source: Author's fieldwork.

**Table A.7: Multivariate Regressions**

Variable	Political Accountability1	Political Accountability1	Political Accountability1
	1	2	3
Intercept	-0.229 <sup>a</sup> (0.056)	0.526 <sup>a</sup> (0.154)	0.486 <sup>b</sup> (0.221)
Poor	-0.343 <sup>a</sup> (0.090)	-0.207 <sup>b</sup> (0.098)	-0.314 <sup>a</sup> (0.105)
Land			0.004 <sup>b</sup> (0.002)
Dom			0.381 <sup>a</sup> (0.094)
Dir		-1.250 <sup>a</sup> (0.251)	-1.137 <sup>a</sup> (0.225)
Mardan		-1.309 <sup>a</sup> (0.220)	-0.795 <sup>a</sup> (0.215)
Muzaffargarh		-.875 <sup>a</sup> (0.188)	-0.664 <sup>a</sup> (0.182)
Sanghar		-1.011 <sup>a</sup> (0.180)	-0.461 <sup>b</sup> (0.191)
Thatta		-1.143 <sup>a</sup> (0.206)	-0.259 (0.236)
Toba Tek Singh		-0.525 <sup>a</sup> (0.171)	-0.475 <sup>a</sup> (0.163)
Literacy (Female) <sup>c</sup>			0.251 <sup>c</sup> (0.151)
Literacy (Male) <sup>c</sup>			0.575 <sup>a</sup> (0.171)
R-Squared	0.010	0.007	0.278
Observations	1,000	1,000	741
Village Dummies	No	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes

Notes: Dependent variables: "political accountability 1" = index of political accountability generated from meetings with *nazim* (mayor), meetings with councilor, proportion of females with identity card, proportion of males with identity card, proportion of females who voted, and proportion of males who voted. This variable has been generated for adults only. Independent variables: (i) poor = household below the poverty line, (ii) literacy = proportion of literate adults in household, (iii) dom = member of dominant kinship group, (iv) controls include: occupation, tenancy, migration status of household, landownership, headcount, and female landownership.

a 1% level of significance.

b 5% level of significance.

c 10% level of significance.

Source: Author's fieldwork.



**Table A.8: Multivariate Regressions**

Variable	Political Accountability 2		
	1	2	3
Intercept	-0.213 <sup>a</sup> (0.057)	0.602 <sup>a</sup> (0.155)	0.480 <sup>a</sup> (0.223)
Poor	-0.394 <sup>a</sup> (0.09)	-0.248 <sup>b</sup> (0.098)	-0.345 <sup>a</sup> (0.106)
Land			0.004 <sup>b</sup> (0.002)
Dom			0.423 <sup>a</sup> (0.095)
Dir		-1.187 <sup>a</sup> (0.251)	-1.112 <sup>a</sup> (0.226)
Mardan		-1.139 <sup>a</sup> (0.222)	-0.849 <sup>a</sup> (0.214)
Muzaffargarh		-0.965 <sup>a</sup> (0.188)	-0.750 <sup>a</sup> (0.183)
Sanghar		-1.110 <sup>a</sup> (0.180)	-0.566 <sup>a</sup> (0.192)
Thatta		-1.207 <sup>a</sup> (0.207)	-0.281 <sup>b</sup> (0.238)
Toba Tek Singh		-0.586 <sup>a</sup> (0.172)	-0.558 <sup>a</sup> (0.164)
Literacy (Male) <sup>c</sup>			0.628 <sup>a</sup> (0.172)
Literacy (Female) <sup>c</sup>			0.282 <sup>c</sup> (0.153)
R-Squared	0.02	0.08	0.29
Observations	998	998	739
Village Dummies	No	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes

Notes: Dependent variables: "political accountability 2" = index of political accountability generated from meetings with *nazim* (mayor), meetings with councilor, proportion of females with identity card, proportion of males with identity card, proportion of females who voted, proportion of males who voted, awareness of citizen community boards, and awareness of school councils. This variable has been generated for adults only. Independent variables: (i) poor = household below the poverty line, (ii) literacy = proportion of literate adults in household, (iii) dom = member of dominant kinship group, (iv) controls include: occupation, tenancy, migration status of household, landownership, headcount, and female landownership.

a 1% level of significance.

b 5% level of significance.

c 10% level of significance.

Source: Author's fieldwork.

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